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ABSTRACT 
Since the beginning of transition in 1990 from a centrally planned to a market oriented economy, 
the performance of Poland’s economy has been outstanding if we take GDP growth as our measure.  
In our opinion it is not specific reforms that can explain this performance but the radical (“big 
bang”) reforms at the beginning of transition in conjunction with persistent efforts during the two 
decades by all governments, no matter what their political orientation, to keep on a reform path. 
Reforming a centrally planned economy that has very serious macroeconomic disequilibria implies 
reforms that can be done immediately but also structural or systemic reforms that require years to 
implement. Both types of reforms will be discussed. In a democratic context reforms can only be 
undertaken in a sustained way if a majority of voters favours such reform efforts. Even when 
reform-friendly governments were voted out of office in the Polish case, the new governments in 
Poland never reversed reforms undertaken by the previous government. This continuous reform 
stance over two decades is the main cause of the Polish growth miracle. The reasons for the ability 
of Polish policy makers to pursue economic and administrative reforms in spite of short-run costs to 
large sections of society will be discussed extensively.  
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The Polish growth miracle: outcome of persistent reform efforts 
 
Executive Summary 
 
On January 1st 1990 the first non-Communist Polish government since World War II under Prime 
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki embarked on an ambitious program of economic reform with the aim 
to start the transition from a centrally planned to a market oriented economy. The initial conditions 
for this reform effort were very disadvantageous since in 1989 the Polish economy experienced 
inflationary bouts close to hyperinflation, brought on by a wage-price spiral, and was characterized 
by pervasive shortages and a large shadow sector.  
 
Two decades later, the Polish economy is often hailed for its outstanding growth performance. So, 
given that the Polish economy was in the doldrums in 1989 our essay pursues the question of what 
can explain this spectacular turn around as far as growth is concerned. However, we also want to 
address those critical voices that set the Polish “growth miracle” in perspective by citing 
contracting employment, a steep rise in unemployment and rising inequality in income. However, by 
the end of the first decade of the 21st century labor market trends improved dramatically, so that 
over the long haul we can speak of a truly outstanding performance of the Polish economy. The 
main hypothesis of this paper states that this performance is intimately linked to persistent reform 
efforts by successive Polish governments.  
 
The most important of these reforms were the initial reforms implemented in January 1990 by a 
team of economists headed by Leszek Balcerowicz, which stuck with perseverance to the aims of the 
reforms in the years 1990 and 1991 in spite of mounting pressures from workers and firms 
demanding that some of the stringent conditions of the reform policies be relaxed. Since these 
reforms produced visible benefits to the Polish population in the form of rising GDP in a relatively 
short period of time, a majority of voters found that economic reforms improved their lives and thus 
was willing to let the government pursue further reforms. Four big reforms were tackled towards 
the end of the nineties, namely the reforms of the health, pension and educational systems as well as 
a regional reform. Furthermore, in the run up to EU accession in 2004 a multitude of other 
structural reforms had to be undertaken by Polish policy makers, among them the introduction of a 
well functioning financial sector, privatization, reforms of labor market and social policies, of the 
corporate and personal income tax system and the development of civil legislation. 
 
Three blocks of reforms were particularly important in the persistent reform effort of Polish 
government. First, the reforms of the Mazowiecki government that brought Poland back from the 
brink of disaster by macroeconomic stabilization, price liberalization and import liberalization 
policies, which also set the Polish economy on the transformational path from a centrally planned 
to a market economy. These reforms unleashed the creativity of new private firms and (with a lag) 
forced many managers of state-owned enterprises to engage in “deep restructuring”, i.e. to alter 
the production process, to change the mix of the firm’s output, to engage in marketing and to shed 
unproductive labor. These positive effects of the reforms on firm behavior explains the positive 
growth that the Polish economy exhibited since 1992, two years into the transformational reform 
process. The second large block of reforms was implemented in 1999, when reforms of health, 
education, pensions and of regional administration were enacted. These reforms can be considered 
modernizing reforms as they tackled institutions, which were developed under communism and 
which were in their existing shape not conducive to improve the competitiveness of the Polish 
economy and to ensure sustainable government finances. The third block of reforms are those of the 
first Tusk government towards the end of the analyzed period; they can be considered of the “fine-
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tuning” nature. These reforms improved legislation regarding the health and the pensions reforms, 
for example, but they also modernized the structure of public finance.      
 
While it is important for the performance of an economy that reforms are implemented it is at least 
as important that these reforms are not reversed by successive governments. The main reason for 
the outstanding growth performance of the Polish economy seems to lie in the fact that none of the 
important reforms were reversed even when the opposition came to power. Most of the important 
reforms were enacted by center-right governments. Since these reforms often imposed large costs in 
the short-run, the reforming governments were voted out of office and left-of-center governments 
took their place. What is crucial for the reform process was the willingness of the new governments 
to allow the positive growth effects of the reforms to materialize by not reversing part of the reforms 
or the entire reforms. These positive growth effects in turn convinced a majority of voters to elect a 
reform-friendly government, which then initiated the enactment of additional reforms.  
 
This virtuous circle driving the reform process was possible because there was a broad consensus 
by policy makers and pundits across the political divide that Poland had to embark on and maintain 
a reform course. This broad consensus came about because of a geopolitical reason. Polish society 
has always identified strongly with Western Europe and, when this became possible, wanted to join 
the European Union as fast as possible, considering broad reforms as a necessary condition for 
achieving this aim.  
 
The declared goal of the undertaken reforms was to increase the competitiveness of the Polish 
economy. But this meant, of course, that state-owned firms or privatized firms had to restructure, 
which also implied the shedding of redundant labor. This process of shake out of unproductive 
workers went on throughout the 1990s, resulting in a large drop in employment and a large rise in 
unemployment. Consecutively, especially older and less skilled workers had great difficulties in 
flowing out of unemployment. Successive governments reacted to this situation by allowing a large 
part of the older and less skilled unemployed to take early retirement or to go on disability benefits. 
This “deactivation” of a substantial part of the workforce throughout the 1990s is the downside of 
the growth miracle of the Polish economy. 
4 
 
I. Introduction  
 
On January 1st 1990 the first non-Communist Polish government since World War II under Prime 
Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki embarked on an ambitious program of economic reform with the aim 
to start the transition from a centrally planned to a market oriented economy. The initial conditions 
for this reform effort were very disadvantageous since in 1989 the Polish economy experienced 
inflationary bouts close to hyperinflation, brought on by a wage-price spiral, and was characterized 
by pervasive shortages and a large shadow sector. In addition, the “dollarization” of the Polish 
economy was in an advanced state since the Polish population held most of its savings in dollars, 
implying that monetary policy had become an ineffective tool in the attempt to restore 
macroeconomic equilibrium to the Polish economy.  
 
When we look at the two decades since the beginning of the reforms, the performance of the Polish 
economy has been exemplary. Taking GDP growth as our measure of performance, we can infer 
from figure 1 that Poland had a short transition recession, lasting only two years, while Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), excluding Poland1, had a slump that lasted four years. It is also striking that 
it took the Polish economy only six years to get back to pre-transition levels of GDP, while the 
economies of CEE, taken together, managed this only after a dozen years. The cumulative growth 
of Poland’s GDP in the period 1992 to 2009 was larger than GDP growth of all the other aggregates 
shown in figure 1: CEE, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the EU-15 and the United 
States. What is also noteworthy is continued positive growth after the onset of the world financial 
crisis unlike CEE, the EU-15 and the U.S., which all experienced a sharp contraction in 2009. If we 
take real GDP per capita (in 2000 US$) as a second measure of performance, then this measure for 
Poland more than doubled between 1990 and 2009 from 3,097 US$ to 6,331 US$, an achievement 
not reached by any other of the transition economies in CEE. Comparing the trajectories of labor 
productivity and real wages in figure 2 we can pinpoint one cause of this good performance: labor 
productivity was above real wages throughout the period outpacing the latter especially in the first 
decade of new century.   
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the employment-to-population ratios and unemployment rates for the same set 
of countries as in figure 1. These measures certainly tell a different story than that of GDP growth. 
Until 2003 employment in Poland fell precipitously to very low levels in international perspective 
while the unemployment rate was far higher for most of the period, reaching a peak of 20 percent in 
2002. Only since accession to the European Union do we observe vigorous growth of the 
employment ratio and a steep decline in the unemployment rate, which in the years 2007 to 2009 for 
the first time reached single-digit levels since 1992.  
 
Both the inequality of earnings and the inequality of income rose substantially over the two 
decades. The Gini coefficient of earnings rose from roughly 21 percent in 1989 to 34 percent in 
2006, the last year we have reliable data, while the Gini coefficient of income rose from 
approximately 27 percent to 34 percent in 2008. In many countries, and also in some transition 
countries of CEE like, for example, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, earnings inequality tends to 
be higher than income inequality because of transfers to those with low earning capacity. In Poland, 
the Gini coefficients of earnings and income are very close to each other, indicating that Polish 
society spends relatively little on social transfer payments. The fact that the Gini coefficient of 
earnings has risen over the transition can be seen as a positive development since the rise implies 
that the labor market remunerates more productive workers better than before the transition. What is 
worrisome, however, is the fact that the inequality of income had the same level as the inequality of 
earnings throughout the transition.  
                                                 
1
 We include here in CEE the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.    
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In spite of these caveats regarding employment, unemployment and income inequality, it is still true 
that real GDP per capita doubled in Poland over the last two decades and that growth in GDP 
eventually caused vigorous growth of employment and a large fall in unemployment. So, over the 
long haul we still can speak of an impressive performance of the Polish economy, which is 
intimately linked to the economic reform policies pursued by successive Polish governments.  
 
In my opinion, the most important of these reforms were the initial reforms implemented in January 
1990 by a team of economists headed by Leszek Balcerowicz. Since these reforms produced visible 
benefits to the Polish population in the form of rising GDP in a relatively short period of time, a 
majority of voters found that economic reforms improved their lives and thus was willing to let the 
government pursue further reforms. Towards the end of the nineties reforms of the health, pension 
and educational systems were enacted as well as a regional reform. Furthermore, in the run up to 
EU accession in 2004 a multitude of other structural reforms had to be undertaken by Polish policy 
makers, among them the introduction of a well functioning financial sector, privatization, reforms 
of labor market and social policies, of the corporate and personal income tax system and the 
development of civil legislation. When encountering social resistance to some or parts of these 
reforms, this resistance was overcome by claims that these reforms were an integral part of the EU 
accession process.  
 
Before discussing the specific reform policies I will give by a bird’s-eye view of all Polish 
governments since 1989 and their involvement in economic reform in order to demonstrate the 
persistence in the reform effort. In my opinion this persistence came about because even though 
center-right reform-friendly governments alternated with left-of-center “reform-neutral” 
governments for the first 15 years of the discussed period (1989-2011), the latter governments never 
completely reversed any of the major reforms enacted previously. At most, they introduced some 
modifications, as happened in the case of the health and pension reforms.  
 
A word of caution is in order, though. The performance of the Polish economy, while not 
conceivable without the persistence of government reform efforts, has, of course, also other reasons, 
especially if we look at the performance in the first decade of the new century. For example, a 
relatively low government debt, a good export performance, also caused by frequent devaluations of 
the Złoty, a large internal market, consumer optimism and greatly improved industrial relations are 
all reasons that help explain why the Polish economy has performed so well in the last years, 
including those of the crisis.  
 
 
II. Polish governments and economic reforms: a bird’s-eye view  
 
Table A1 in the appendix shows the 16 governments of Poland since the communists relinquished 
power. Most of the governments were short-lived, that is they were not formed for an entire 
legislature of the Sejm (the Polish parliament), pointing at the relative unstable political landscape 
of Poland. Also, many parties were dissolved or merged with other parties contributing further to a 
somewhat chaotic political landscape. The governments that are listed in the table can be divided 
into reform-friendly governments and “reform-neutral” governments, that is governments that did 
not pursue major reforms but that also did not try to go back to the status quo ante once they came 
to power. The first two governments in the post-communist era, the governments of Hanna 
Suchocka, Jerzy Buzek and Donald Tusk can be counted definitely as reform-friendly governments, 
while that of Jarosław Kaczyński to a lesser degree. The parties forming these governments are 
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predominantly on the center-right of the political spectrum, while the parties forming reform-neutral 
governments find themselves predominantly on the left. 
 
Inspection of the large table 1 shows that two governments were especially responsible for the 
economic reforms that Poland underwent. First and foremost, the Mazowiecki government enacted 
10 reforms in January 1990 simultaneously. These reform acts are associated with the “shock 
therapy” or “big bang” approach that will be discussed in detail below.  Here we just mention the 
principal aims of the most important of these acts. The first act abolished subsidies to loss making 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and also foresaw the possibility of bankruptcy of such firms. The 
second act wanted to prevent the monetization of the budget deficit, while the third eliminated bad 
loans to state firms and imposed positive real interest rates. The fourth act introduced large marginal 
taxes on excessive wage growth to rapture the link between wage growth and inflation. The act on 
foreign currency established internal convertibility of the zloty and got rid of the last vestiges of the 
state monopoly in international trade. The acts on employment and on severance pay and 
unemployment benefits were insofar important as they regulated layoffs and the income support for 
workers flowing into unemployment. These acts were indispensable if the solidarity trade union was 
to agree to the possibility of labor shedding by firms, something not possible under central planning 
but absolutely vital for the beginning of a reallocation process of labor from unviable to new 
profitable activities. Most of the mentioned acts had as their main aim macroeconomic stabilization, 
the last two described acts were put in place to begin the construction of a social safety net 
considered important for cushioning the effects of transition for workers. 
 
We speak of “shock therapy” or “big bang” because reforms were applied on such a broad scale. 
This could be done because the country was confronted with a major crisis. The political economy 
of reform literature tells us that it might be very difficult to revert to the status quo ante when such 
broad reforms are implemented. The Olszewski government, also a right-center government formed 
after the November 1991 elections, was not willing to reverse them in any major way. In particular, 
it was not inclined to bail out any SOE with subsidies even if it was in great financial distress. This 
policy of not giving in to tremendous pressures allowed the effects of the reforms to materialize 
with the economy experiencing positive growth. As we shall see below, the fact that the Olszewski 
government did not reverse policies regarding SOE subsidies meant that managers of SOEs 
understood that no help from the state was forthcoming and that they had to manage their firms in 
the most efficient way possible.  
 
The second most reform-friendly government was headed by Jerzy Buzek. Leszek Balcerowicz who 
had been Minister of Finance in the first two post-communist governments and the architect of the 
“shock therapy” reforms, again held the same post in the Buzek government. Buzek had built his 
election campaign around promises of major reforms. So when he won the elections he enacted four 
important reforms: the pension, education, health and administrative reforms. They were important 
insofar as they had a strongly modernizing aspect and/or because they set public finances on a better 
footing. Between these major reforms and the reforms of the Mazowiecki, Bielecki and Suchocka 
governments lay more than five years. So, one way to think about Polish reform efforts is to say that 
after major reform efforts policy makers allow the reforms to play out and give a necessary 
breathing space to society.  
 
It is striking, though, that not one major reform has ever been revoked by a successor government. 
In my opinion this is the key to the Polish growth miracle; we have a virtuous circle where large 
economic reform projects produce in the medium run discernible benefits. While reform-friendly 
governments might be thrown out of office because of the short-run costs of the reforms, the 
successor governments allow these reforms to play out, producing visible positive results. This 
eventually convinces voters to elect another reform-friendly government, which then launches a 
7 
 
new large reform package. At the same time reform-neutral governments even if not adopting large 
reform projects push the reform agenda also ahead by giving wide publicity and promoting 
discussion of reform strategies for Poland. So, left-of-center governments help prepare the ground 
for new reform projects being enacted by a successor center-right government. That the left-of-
center governments did not enact themselves major modernizing reforms but through publicly held 
discussions only prepared the ground for their enactment can be explained by the fact that many of 
their voters (workers, pensioners, public employees, and to some extent farmers) had to bear a 
disproportionate share of the short-term costs of any major reform effort. 
 
There are at least two reasons why the described virtuous circle was sustainable in the Polish case. 
The most important reason in my opinion is geopolitical, namely the identification of Polish society 
with Western Europe. Poles have always considered themselves culturally linked with the West of 
Europe and perceived the forty years of Russian influence after the end of World War II as 
something profoundly undesirable. Consequently, the Polish public in a large majority was intent to 
join the European Union as soon as possible, being willing to undertake the necessary sacrifice to 
reach this goal. This generated a strong consensus among policy makers and pundits of all moderate 
party affiliations to pursue systemic and modernizing reforms, which prepared Poland for accession 
to the Union. It is noteworthy that we see a very similar scenario in Estonia where the political elite 
across the political divide has taken recourse to the same broad consensus on the necessity to reform 
the Estonian economy in a coherent and consistent fashion (Eamets, 2011).  
 
A second reason is linked to the inner workings of the Polish government. The political science 
literature highlights the importance of the decision making process at the cabinet level when 
providing a taxonomy of parliamentary-based coalition governments. In Poland, like in many 
countries, we have cabinets where apart from the prime minister the minister of finance has more 
decision power than the other ministers. In principle, the finance minister can block any ministerial 
projects that threaten the budget and/or undermine the general direction of macroeconomic policies. 
All consecutive governments independent of party composition had finance ministers with very 
clear notions about the need to keep on the reform track. Consequently, any attempt of a complete 
reversal of some undertaken major reform never had a chance even under a left-of-center 
government. 
 
Donald Tusk is the only prime minister whose coalition after having passed several important 
reforms was reelected. The Tusk governments are certainly reform-friendly as they have enacted 
important laws on public sector finances, on the streamlining of the pension system (above all 
eliminating inefficient bridging schemes) and on the partial commercialization of the health care 
system. But the reform efforts of his governments are more of the fine-tuning nature with the main 
reforms having been done apart from the Mazowiecki and the Buzek governments by the Bielecki 
government (enacting personal income and corporate tax reforms) and the Suchocka government 
(enacting a sensible privatization law and the law on VAT). It is certainly striking that all these 
reform-friendly governments have their roots in the Solidarity movement, while the main coalition 
partner of the reform-neutral governments descends from the Polish Communist Party (the Polish 
United Worker Party - PZPR).        
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III. Setting the stage for the Polish reform efforts 
 
III.1. The failure of market socialism  
 
Communist governments in Hungary and Poland experimented with the introduction of market 
socialism, consisting in an attempt to apply market principles to centrally planned economies. In a 
celebrated paper Kornai (1986) demonstrated why this attempt failed miserably, pointing to a 
political economy argument and to technical reasons. For Kornai, in a centrally planned economy 
bureaucratic coordination is the principal mechanism that organizes economic, political, cultural 
and social life. In a market economy, in turn, the dominant organization principle is market 
coordination. In a world where the public ownership of the means of production strongly dominates 
and where the Communist “nomenclature” jealously guards its economic and political monopoly, 
the coexistence of bureaucratic and market coordination is difficult. Whenever there is a conflict 
between bureaucratic and market coordination, the former wins since the main agents in a centrally 
planned economy, i.e. central bureaucrats but also firm managers, are foremost members of a 
bureaucratic apparatus that has as its main aim the preservation of its monopoly position in society.  
 
There are also technical reasons why the application of market principles to a centrally planned 
economy does not show the desired result, which is to have price signals determine a more efficient 
allocation of resources. In a market economy market coordination is based on price signals, which 
strongly influence the behavior of buyers and sellers. Since prices and the interests of bureaucrats 
from the center, managers and workers are hardly interlinked in a centrally planned economy, price 
signals cannot really influence the behavior of the agents. For example, the well-being of a manager 
directing a firm depends nearly exclusively on plan fulfillment and not on profits achieved by 
maximizing the difference between the price and the costs of production since loss making firms are 
always bailed out by the center. So, there are no incentives for this manager to respond to price 
signals and to economize on the costs of production. Thus, trying to incorporate market 
coordination via prices into a centrally planned economy turned out to be rather futile.  
 
This failure of market socialism is important for our story, since many of the leading economists in 
Poland were involved in the reform efforts associated with market socialism in the early 1980s. 
They learned the hard way that piecemeal reforms of the central planning system did not lead to 
sustainable increases in efficiency. That is the main reason why in Poland, and in all other CEE 
transition countries for that matter, after the collapse of Communism those directly working on 
economic reform saw only one sensible reform path, the direct transition to an economy based on 
market principles and on predominantly private ownership of the means of production. 
 
 
III.2 Initial conditions of the reform process 
 
The Polish economy, like all economies of CEE, was plagued by the legacies of central planning, 
which had a profound impact on the reform policies chosen and on the length of the transition. I 
summarize the most important initial conditions at the beginning of the reform process in order to 
demonstrate the difficulties that the economic reform team was confronted with when launching the 
transition in January 1990.  
 
A crucial initial condition was the macroeconomic disequilibrium that we present in a schematic 
fashion in figure 4. A centrally planned economy is supply constrained, that is, at the given 
(administered) price level PA output is rationed and the quantity demanded far exceeds the quantity 
supplied. This has at least two important implications for reformers who want to arrive at an 
economy based on market principles. First, firms in a supply constrained economy can sell all of 
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their output independent of the quality of their products and irrespective of consumer preferences. 
Consequently, product quality and satisfying consumers’ demand are not a priority for managers. 
Once prices are liberalized and market forces are allowed to take a hold, the economy becomes 
demand constrained and managers need to ensure that their products are competitive in terms of 
price but also in terms of quality. In addition managers have to get involved in the marketing of 
their products, something that was completely unnecessary when the economy was supply 
constrained. Whether managers of SOE’s had the right skills to function in a market-based economy 
was certainly an open question when the reforms were launched; it was clear, though, that the 
incentive structure for managers would have to change if their firms were to survive in a demand 
constrained environment. The second implication of a supply constrained economy is that it creates 
potentially a large stock of forced savings, the so called “monetary overhang”, since in each period, 
as demonstrated in figure 4, at prevailing prices the public is willing to buy QD but the economy is 
only supplying QS. When a lot of money chases few goods and the government loses control over 
prices, inflationary pressures build up and these inflationary pressures are transformed into open 
inflation as Poland experienced in 1989. The annual inflation rate in that year was about 3000%, 
eliminating the monetary overhang. However, as long as the disequilibrium prevails, the nominal 
value of goods wanted is larger than the nominal value of goods offered. Price liberalization will 
result in “corrective inflation” correcting for the inequality of the nominal value of the flow of 
income and the nominal value of the flow of goods. In figure 4 this correction is shown by the 
shooting up of the price level from PA to PE. To reach the equilibrium the nominal value of income 
(wages) has to rise less than the nominal value of the goods offered. Corrective inflation thus 
implies a large fall of real wages. An interesting account of corrective inflation in Poland and its 
causes is given in Gomułka (1992).  
 
The centrally planned economies operated internationally according to an overall plan within the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and based on the principle of division of labor. 
In other words, these economies allocated resources according to what this overall plan said and not 
according to relative world prices. Opening these economies to world markets had some short-term 
costs and some longer-term benefits. Since most SOEs did use inputs without considering relative 
world prices (a good example is the use of energy here) when these economies were opened up to 
world markets many of the SOEs became unviable unless they restructured rapidly, that is unless 
they used resources in a rational way reflecting relative scarcities as expressed by world prices. In 
the longer term trade liberalization, which implies the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade and the 
lowering of tariffs, thus forced upon managers of SOEs a rationale use of resources. In addition, 
once prices were liberalized trade liberalization made the resulting highly monopolistic goods 
markets more competitive through competition from foreign firms thus forcing SOEs to adopt more 
efficient production processes and to improve product quality. 
 
At the beginning of the transition SOEs were the dominant economic units in the Polish economy. 
So, most of the physical capital in the economy was owned by the state. All economists involved in 
the Polish reform effort were convinced that private property of the means of production was a 
necessary condition for long-term growth. This is not surprising since the large literature on 
empirical and theoretical aspects of privatization points unequivocally to a superior performance of 
firms with privately owned capital in industrialized countries. This literature took its inspiration 
from Hayek (1945) who shows very convincingly the link of ownership type and long-run growth 
by demonstrating how private entrepreneurs can adjust to dynamic changes relying on a 
decentralized and flexible price system much more efficiently than a central planner. At any rate, 
the need for large-scale privatization was never in doubt as far as Polish reformers were concerned. 
Thus, the reformers had the daunting task that nearly the entire stock of capital had to be privatized.  
This was difficult for several reasons. First, the sheer size of the task was unprecedented in history. 
Second, there were problems of the valuation of SOEs linked to the issue of how to sequence the 
10 
 
privatization process, that is whether to first restructure and then to privatize or vice versa. The third 
area of problems were related to how to privatize and what different privatization schemes implied 
for corporate governance. Selling the stock to domestic investors in a short period of time was not 
possible since corrective inflation had wiped out most of the savings; selling the capital stock to 
foreigners, assuming they were willing to acquire Polish capital, was politically not feasible. The 
reason for this has to do with the fact that most of the capital stock had been accumulated under 
communism and that this accumulation had been achieved by emphasizing the investment goods 
sector at the expense of consumption. Clearly, the public wanted to be compensated for these 
sacrifices that had lasted for decades.  So in Poland, like in all other CEE economies apart from 
Hungary, the industrial capital stock was given away to all citizens, leading to some important 
corporate governance issues. In essence if each citizen has a small share of the capital it is 
impossible to exert control over the privatized firms’ managers. In Poland this issue of lacking 
control over management was resolved by setting up National Investment Funds (NIFs) which 
managed 512 medium and large SOEs proper and commercialized SOEs. Each member of the adult 
population received a “universal share certificate”, which was eventually converted to a share in 
each of the 15 NIFs.2 At any rate the difficulties connected to privatization briefly discussed here 
had the important consequence that SOEs could not be privatized over night and that the reformers 
had to deal with SOEs as the main economic units of the Polish economy for some time to come 
once reforms were launched. 
 
In a centrally planned economy, even in its reformed version of market socialism, many SOEs had 
“soft budget constraints”, that is they were allowed by the center to have total costs larger than total 
revenues on a continuous basis. The center simply redistributed funds from profit making to loss 
making firms thus guaranteeing the long-run survival of the latter. “Soft budget constraints”, of 
course, meant that managers did not have to care about an efficient use of resources. The imposition 
of “hard budget constraints” (total revenues ≥ total costs) was thus one of the most pressing 
problems of the reformers. The Polish reformers intended to achieve the imposition of “hard budget 
constraints” by slashing subsidies to SOEs. If managers became convinced, so the argument, that 
the state would no longer bail them out if they made losses, they would start to use resources in an 
economic fashion.  
 
Slashing subsidies to SOEs was not only considered an important tool to impose economizing 
behavior by managers it was also thought to be vital for the fiscal position of the government once 
the reform plans were implemented. The main source of tax revenues was the turnover tax paid by 
SOEs; price and trade liberalizations would bring, at least temporarily a fall in revenues of SOEs 
and thus a large fall in tax revenues. The reformers intended to introduce unemployment benefits 
for laid-off workers and early retirement schemes, which would be new large items on the 
expenditure side of the budget. So, even if the reform government slashed subsidies to SOEs and if 
it was able to suspend the servicing of the external debt, large budget deficits seemed to be pre-
programmed. Since at the beginning of the reforms the banking and financial sectors were not 
                                                 
2
 The Polish Mass Privatization Program was maybe the reform policy where Poland was less successful than other 
countries since it took 4 years after the beginning of transition to enact a law on it and nearly 6 years to set up the NIFs. 
I will not discuss privatization, which, for political reasons, was very piecemeal in Poland and drawing out over more 
than a decade.  This slow performance with respect to privatization can be interpreted in several ways . On the one 
hand, if the mass privatization of SOEs had been done early and rapidly, the performance of the Polish economy might 
have been even more impressive than the one we observe. On the other hand, though, my hunch is that given the 
resistance of workers to privatization, forcing upon society the privatization of the majority of SOEs in a short period 
might have derailed the whole transition process. Finally, as I will discuss below, the stabilization policies adopted by 
the Mazowiecki government eventually forced managers of many SOEs to begin with the restructuring of their 
enterprise.       
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developed, these governments deficits would have to be monetized. So, to ensure that inflationary 
pressures were rained in, the government deficit had to be reduced as much as possible.  
 
The last legacy that I want to deal with is the absence of a social security system under central 
planning. In CEE there existed no open unemployment, and workers for the most part had life-long 
jobs at one firm if they wished. Estimates for Poland actually show that labor hoarding (hidden 
unemployment) amounted to at least 10 percent of the employed. Apart from pensions, all other 
benefits were given to workers by the firm where they worked.  So, one important task for the 
reformers was to preside over the divestiture of “social assets” in possession of firms since under 
conditions of liberalized markets firms could no longer afford to provide these services to their 
workers. More importantly, the government had to build a social safety net from scratch. This social 
safety net became necessary since reforms created unemployment and increased poverty in the 
country, at least temporarily. Thus a social safety net had to be developed that effectively and in a 
targeted way alleviated poverty and helped the unemployed temporarily. The necessary help for the 
unemployed might serve as an example of the complexity of creating a social safety net. This help 
had to be administered by labor offices, which in Communist times existed but whose function had 
been to find workers for firms in a situation of excess demand for labor and no open unemployment. 
Once reforms set in and workers were laid off from firms and new labor market entrants did not 
readily find jobs, these labor offices had to essentially perform three tasks: (a) administer 
unemployment benefits; (b) match unemployed workers with vacant posts (“job brokerage”); and 
(c) administer active labor market policies (ALMP). Not only had resources be made available for 
these tasks, but the staff of the labor offices had to be retrained to fill out these new functions. A 
final task regarding the build-up of an efficient social safety net was the elimination of many non-
targeted subsidies that were prevalent in the centrally planned economy. 
 
III.3 A taxonomy of reforms and the political economy of reforms 
As we have seen in the previous section, Polish policy makers had to battle for reforms on many 
fronts. One way to think about the many reforms that have to be undertaken is to introduce a 
timeline along which reforms can be implemented3. Figure 5, showing such a timeline, 
demonstrates that some reforms can be implemented at once while other reforms, in particular of 
the systemic type, can take a very long time. Price liberalization, trade liberalization and 
macroeconomic stabilization are all policies that can be implemented essentially over night, while 
reforming the labor market or generating a business friendly environment can take more than a 
decade. In the case of Poland, which did have a capitalist economy in embryonic form before World 
War II, the development of a legal infrastructure, which guarantees strong property rights and 
regulates commercial activities turned out to be less time consuming and problematic than for 
example in the successor states of the Soviet Union. The main reason was, of course, that in Poland 
law makers could go back to pre-world war II legal texts, while Russian or Ukrainian law makers 
could not do that. Figure 5 at any rate suggests that one needs a long breath and a clear vision when 
one wants to reform a formerly centrally planned economy and set it on a long-run growth path 
since all pieces of a complex puzzle have to put in place and that at different times. In my opinion, 
Polish policy makers irrespective of party affiliation and high government officials had this long 
breath and clear vision.   
 
We can also use the first panel of figure 5 to distinguish between “big bang” and “gradualist” 
reforms in a transition context. When the first three policies are simultaneously implemented we 
speak of “big bang” reforms while if they are applied sequentially we characterize reforms as 
“gradualist”. The former type of reforms tends to exhibit complementarities, so if it is politically 
feasible it is better to pursue these policies simultaneously. The vast field of the political economy 
                                                 
3
 The first paragraph of this section is based on Schaffer (1993).  
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of reforms in general and in a transition context in particular, however, has identified many political 
feasibility constraints of reforms (“ex ante constraints”) and reversibility constraints of reforms (“ex 
post constraints”) that might make the “big bang” approach an unrealistic option (see, e.g., Roland, 
2002). Those who favor gradualism make the point that it might be politically more feasible to 
implement the one reform which promises the best pay-off to the population. Building on the 
success of such a reform it is then possible to implement additional reforms. We might illustrate the 
advantages and disadvantages of gradualism by looking at price liberalization and trade 
liberalization. If we start off to reform the economy by first liberalizing prices, shortages will 
disappear and the public will be convinced that reforming the economy brings benefits. If, on the 
other hand, reformers liberalize prices and trade simultaneously (and for budgetary reasons slash 
subsidies to firms) many SOEs might become unviable and need to lay off a large part of their 
workforce. The public might then turn against further reforms. Of course, the downside of only 
liberalizing prices is that even after price liberalization relative prices might not reflect the true 
relative scarcity of goods since firms are not exposed to world markets. In addition, given the highly 
monopolistic structure of goods markets, price liberalization might translate into large monopoly 
profits for SOES, which means that there would be little need to become more efficient. A “big 
bang” approach combining price and trade liberalization would have a larger positive effect on the 
efficiency of the economy because of the complementarities of the individual reform policies. 
 
The Polish reformers were “fortunate” insofar as the last communist government had allowed a 
deterioration of the status quo to a degree that made in my opinion the simultaneous introduction of 
several reforms inevitable.4 In other words, the reformers could not opt for a gradualist reform 
strategy; they were pushed by the deteriorated status quo into the pursuit of a “big bang” approach 
if they wanted to prevent hyperinflation, the impoverishment of large sections of society and a 
complete dollarization of the economy. In addition, the deteriorated status quo had weakened any 
resistance within the state apparatus to the rapid action plan proposed by the reform group. More 
important than introducing a set of radical reforms is to stick to these reforms when social pressure 
builds up to reverse some of the reform measures. Here geopolitical considerations can explain the 
success of the government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The Polish public perceived the 
Mazowiecki government as the first Polish government in half a century not dominated by a foreign 
power. The Polish public essentially provided a blank cheque to this first non-Communist 
government that not only allowed the government to implement the reforms but gave it also enough 
time for the reforms to play out. This breathing space was essential for the reforms to eventually 
have a positive impact on GDP growth after a very short transition recession that lasted only two 
years. The strong growth of GDP from 1993 until the Russian crisis of 1998 convinced policy 
makers and a majority of Polish society to pursue further reforms, which were then implemented at 
the end of the nineties. 
 
A second geopolitical reason impacting positively on Polish reform efforts has been the already 
mentioned identification of Polish society with Western Europe and the intent of a majority of 
Polish society to join the European Union. So, any Polish government could present structural 
reforms as necessary steps for accession to the Union while at the same time pronouncing that it 
undertook these reforms only reluctantly. At the same time, the accession process helped Poland to 
modernize her political, legal and administrative structures in an accelerated fashion. The successor 
                                                 
4
 Schaffer (1993) states that Polish policy makers had the choice between stabilization first, followed by liberalization 
matters or by applying stabilization and liberalization measures simultaneously. At the same time he stresses that the 
Mazowiecki government “faced a crisis situation. Prices were increasing at near-hyperinflation rates (..). The 
government budget deficit had ballooned in the first half of the year, to about 15% of GDP. Output was falling and 
wages and labor costs were at unsustainable levels. Foreign exchange reserves were dangerously low. Shortages and 
queues were widespread.” Given this gamut of difficulties, I find it hard to believe that the solidarity-led government 
really had a choice between a gradual and a “big bang” reform approach.  
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states of the Soviet Union had no prospects to join the EU in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the 
modernization process, which imposes large short-term costs on society, was considered less 
desirable and was politically much more difficult to implement.  
 
One final important political economy consideration that should be discussed is the presence of 
civic society in Poland even under communism. A comparison of Russia and Poland is particularly 
instructive in this context. In the Soviet Union any remnants of civic society were thoroughly 
destroyed during the industrialization and collectivization campaigns in the thirties as well through 
the Great Terror in 1936-1938. At the end of the thirties Russian society was completely “atomized” 
and no social activity was possible outside the Communist party since that time. In communist 
Poland there were two powerful social organizations outside the realm of the Communist party, the 
Catholic Church and the Solidarity trade union. Both these organizations upheld civic virtues during 
the communist dictatorship, civic virtues that were completely absent in the Soviet Union. Some 
authors explain the state capture by oligarchs in Russia with this absence of civic virtues in society 
at large. The fact that Russian oligarchs got a hold on the levers of state power for their own private 
aims had political repercussions in that a consistent and broad reform agenda could not be 
implemented. In Poland, on the other hand, the existence of civic virtues prevented the emergence 
of an oligarchic class and was thus at least partially responsible for the pursuit of consistent and 
broad reforms.  Roland in the cited paper makes forcefully the point that to fully understand the 
successes and failures of reform policies it is not enough to analyze the mix of economic policies; 
instead it is crucial to embed these economic policies in a broad historical context.   
 
IV. The reform policies of the Mazowiecki government 
 
IV.1 The Program in some detail 
 
In a memorandum on the economic reform program sent to the Bretton Woods institutions in 
September 1989 the Polish government outlined its reform program in broad terms, stating that it 
intended “to transform the Polish economy into a market economy, with an ownership structure 
changing in the direction of that found in the advanced industrial economies.” The program had 
three general ingredients (Government of Poland, 1989): 
 
1. monetary and price stabilization; 
2. structural adjustment; 
3. foreign economic assistance and reduction of foreign debt. 
 
The program under (1) was above all a macroeconomic stabilization program, but as we shall see 
later on it was also conceived to influence the microeconomic behavior of managers of SOEs.   
 
One of the most important elements of the stabilization program was price liberalization. In August 
1989 the new government had already liberalized food prices. In January 1990 the remaining 
administrative price controls were removed with a few exceptions. By January 1991 the shares of 
prices freely determined were 100% of agricultural producer prices, 88% of industrial producer 
prices and 83% of consumer prices respectively. At that time administered prices were applied to 
alcohol, electricity, gas, heating and hot water, rents in state housing, postal services and 
telecommunications as well as state rail and road transportation. Polish reformers (jointly with IMF 
experts) foresaw a rise of the Consumer Price Index of 45% in January 1990 and a rise of 94% over 
the entire year. These forecasts were far off the mark, since in January 1990 alone consumer prices 
rose by 80% and over the whole year of 1990 by roughly 250%.  This larger corrective inflation 
implied a much larger fall of real wages than foreseen: in 1990 real wages in industry fell by 
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between a quarter and 32% (the true magnitude of the fall is disputed in the literature). It also led to 
a liquidity squeeze in the economy in the first half of 1990. 
 
This liquidity squeeze came about because the government in collaboration with the National Bank 
of Poland decided on a very restrictive monetary policy by restricting domestic credit expansion. 
One declared aim of this restrictive monetary policy was the achievement of positive real interest 
rates, which would entice firms and households to hold at least the new stocks of savings 
accumulated after January 1990 in the local currency of the zloty. Since inflation was much larger 
than anticipated the established nominal credit expansion resulted in an excessively large fall of real 
money balances according to Gomulka (1992). The government, always conscious about the danger 
of inflation reigniting, was not willing to adjust credit expansion targets upward thus leading to a 
credit crunch soon after the onset of the reforms in January 1990. Being put under immense 
pressure by SOE managers and representatives of the solidarity trade union, the government 
relented somewhat and eased credit expansion in the second half of 1990. 
 
A third important element of the stabilization strategy was to regain control of the government 
budget, which the previous government had lost in 1989. The principal tool to reaffirm this control 
was the deep cuts in subsidies to SOEs which fell from 15% in 1989 to 6% in 1990. These were 
further reduced in the following year. In addition, tax exemptions for enterprises were nearly totally 
eliminated in the first year of the reforms. While the main aim of this fiscal policy was to reduce the 
deficit, the slashing of subsidies was also thought as a way to “whip” SOE managers into profit 
maximizing or cost minimizing behavior. As we shall see later this secondary aim was only 
achieved after a considerable period of time. Because of the tremendous fall in real wages SOEs 
actually had extraordinary profits in the first half of 1990, leading to large tax revenues and a 
positive government budget in this period. As the liquidity squeeze started to hurt SOEs tax 
revenues fell in the second half of 1990 resulting in a budget deficit. As mentioned in the section on 
initial conditions, the lack of a developed financial sector implies that government deficits have to 
monetized; this is exactly what the Polish government had to do, thus contributing to inflationary 
pressures.  
 
Another important element of the stabilization program was the imposition of a unified exchange 
rate, which was based on the black market rate of 9500 zloty to 1US$. Already prior to the date of 
the “big bang”, the Mazowiecki government had eliminated last residues of the international trade 
monopoly of the state. In January 1990, the domestic market was abruptly exposed to import 
competition when non-tariff restrictions (import licenses) were eliminated over night. In addition 
tariffs were set at low levels: the average tariff rate for all goods was about 12%, for consumer 
goods roughly 16% in 1990. Also, taxes and most restrictions on exports were removed. Some 
authors have considered the established exchange rate as far below the equilibrium value. 
According to them this undervaluation can partially explain the stability of the nominal exchange 
rate in spite of continuing inflation in 1990. The reformers were intent on keeping the nominal 
exchange rate fixed as long as possible since it could serve as an important nominal anchor against 
inflation.5 If the exchange rate was undervalued at the beginning of the reforms it also protected 
domestic producers to some degree and boosted export while at the same time providing a nominal 
anchor against inflation and helping to restore confidence in the zloty. Imposing the unified 
exchange rate at the indicated level boosted exports and limited imports in 1990 leading to a large 
trade surplus and a strong accumulation of foreign reserves. This good trade performance, however, 
                                                 
5
 Let DW PPeP )1(** αα −+= be the price level in the economy, which is a linear combination of world prices 
(assumed constant) and the domestic price level and let e be the nominal exchange rate in Zloty/1US$. As long as e is 
constant, the prices of imported goods do not contribute to inflation. A devaluation of the Zloty will raise e and thus 
increase the overall price level. 
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did not last mainly because of an appreciating real exchange rate and three constraints that Polish 
firms had to deal with. First, the Soviet Union introduced world prices in all CMEA transactions 
and insisted on settling outstanding balances in hard currency. In addition to this cost shock Polish 
SOEs also “lost” their suppliers and their clients in the Soviet Union since the Soviet economy was 
no longer functioning in 1990 and 1991. While this collapse of intra-CMEA trade facilitated the 
reorientation of Polish SOEs to Western markets, at least initially it meant a large fall in export 
earnings. The second shock occurring – and this was a truly exogenous shock – was the social and 
monetary union of West and East Germany in July 1990, which resulted in a complete collapse of 
industrial production in East Germany. So, like in the case of the Soviet Union, Polish SOEs lost 
their traditional German suppliers and clients. A third constraint affecting negatively the trade 
performance of Poland was the protectionist attitude of the European Community, which prevented 
free imports from Poland above all in those sectors where Poland had a comparative advantage 
(agricultural and low skilled manufacturing products). Given these three constraints and a large 
appreciation of the real exchange rate it does not come as a surprise that the trade surplus of 1990 
turned into a trade deficit in 1991. Given this deterioration of the trade performance tremendous 
pressure built up on the government to devalue the zloty. Since the nominal exchange served as an 
anchor of the stabilization programs policy makers were reluctant to give in to this pressure and 
only in May 1991 was the zloty devalued for the first time.         
 
The fifth important element in the stabilization program was the tax-based incomes policy, which is 
to some degree a misnomer as this policy involved a tax surcharge on wages growing above a 
certain norm, which was established over the year by the Council of Ministers by decree. A tax-
based incomes policy in general relies on the following relationship: 
 
percentage change in prices = %change in wages - %change in labor productivity.6 
 
As long as the percentage change in wages does not exceed  the  percentage change in labor 
productivity, prices do not rise, while when wages grow less than labor productivity prices fall. 
When there is a wage-price spiral causing dramatic inflation like in the Polish case a very direct tool 
to cut the link between wage growth and inflation is to ensure that the right hand side of the 
equation is negative. The Polish reformers employed here rather harsh and potentially divisive 
policies by establishing very rigid norms. Enterprises were allowed to raise the wage bill by 30 
percent of the increase in retail prices in January 1990, and by 20 percent thereafter. For the first 
three percent above these ceilings a marginal tax of 200 percent, for larger infractions a marginal 
tax of 500 percent had to be paid. The reason such harsh (low) “correction factors” and such high 
tax rates were applied had to with the fear that a restrictive monetary policy would not be enough to 
cut the link between inflation and wage growth in the Poland of 1989. As it turned out because 
corrective inflation was much larger than anticipated and the preconceived growth rates of credit 
expansion were not altered real money balances contracted more than foreseen and SOEs were in 
no position to grant large wage increases to their workers. So, in the first half of 1990 most firms 
were nowhere near the ceiling as far as permissible wage growth was concerned and hardly any 
SOE paid wage penalties. With monetary policy somewhat relaxed in the second half of 1990 the 
liquidity position of most SOEs improved and many of them reached the ceiling in November and 
December of that year. However, with the beginning of 1991 the collapse of CMEA trade and 
energy deliveries from the Soviet Union that had to be paid in hard currency caused a deterioration 
of the monetary balances of SOEs making it impossible to grant wage increases. The tax-based 
                                                 
6
 This equation can be derived if we assume that prices are a mark-up on wages: P*(Q/L)=γ*W, where γ is a constant, P 
and W are prices and nominal wages respectively, while Q/L is output per worker. Taking logs and the time derivatives 
and solving for d log(P)/dt one gets the equation d log(P)/dt = d log(W)/dt – [d log(Q)/dt – d log(L)/dt], which is the 
equation in the text. 
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incomes policy was thus a rather blunt tool not contributing much to the decline of inflationary 
pressures. 
 
The five elements of the stabilization program did stop a hyperinflation in Poland; it also brought 
down inflation to relatively tolerable levels but it did not eliminate it altogether. For several years 
there were inflationary expectations and pressures impacting on the price level. It took essentially a 
decade to get yearly inflation rates to levels prevailing in OECD countries. Still, overall this part of 
the reform program can be considered a success insofar as inflation was on a downward path 
without the danger to accelerate again and insofar as budget control could be regained. The 
stabilization program also included price liberalization and trade liberalization. Both liberalizations 
had been successful since nearly over night equilibrium in goods markets was established and 
shortages disappeared. Trade liberalization was the main channel through which competitive 
pressures on domestic producers were applied, more importantly it helped firms to redirect much of 
their trade to hard currency areas in a very short period of time.   
 
The proposed concrete structural adjustment measures that foresaw rapid privatization of SOEs and 
a reform of the tax system within a short period of time were not very realistic at least as far as 
privatization was concerned. They were more a declaration of intent than a concrete action plan. 
Privatization of retail shops did occur rapidly, but the expansion of private sector employment was 
above all driven by what Schaffer (1993) calls “growth privatization.” New private firms entering 
the market were responsible for job creation in a disproportionate fashion. For example, Konings, 
Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) show that in 1991 new private firms in the manufacturing sector were 
responsible for 20 percent of job creation even their employment share was only 4 percent. What 
Schaffer calls “privatization proper”, that is the privatization of large enterprises was an extremely 
slow process, which led policy makers to rethink their privatization strategies. The law on large 
scale privatization in its final form still had to wait until April 1993 when it was passed by the 
Sejm.    
 
The third pillar of the “big bang” reforms was the support by the Bretton Woods institutions and by 
the governments of the OECD countries. This support had two pillars. First, the IMF and OECD 
governments provided 2 billion stabilization fund provided in equal parts. Given the low level of 
foreign reserves, this stabilization fund was deemed necessary by the Polish government and the 
IMF to be able to defend the zloty against a speculative attack. With this large fund at its disposal 
the government was credible in its defense of the zloty and no speculative attack occurred. Thus the 
stabilization fund was never used. The second pillar was the write-off of part of Poland’s external 
debt. The Polish government asked the IMF to facilitate negotiations with the aim to cancel 50 
percent of the debt given by official creditors. In March 1991 a deal was struck between the Polish 
government and its official creditors to write off 50 percent of 30 billion US$. A similar deal was 
struck later with the commercial creditors of Poland’s remaining external debt of 13 billion US$. 
These write-offs were of vital importance for the budget, since the resulting interest payments did 
not drive the deficit out of control. A 500 million US$ structural adjustment loan provided by the 
World Bank was an important financial source for improvements in above all the infrastructure of 
state administration. 
 
 
IV.2 The reform program and the behavior of new private firms and SOEs        
 
The economic reforms initiated in January 1990 by the solidarity-led government had a clear 
macroeconomic focus intent on removing the large disequilibria in the economy and stopping 
hyperinflation. The reform program saw no need for microeconomic interventions at the firm level. 
Instead, the reform team had the conviction that the macroeconomic policies directly affecting 
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SOEs, such as the slashing of subsidies, allowing bankruptcy and establishing positive real interest 
rates, would produce the right incentive structure for managers. At the same time it was thought that 
those who had been private entrepreneurs in the centrally planned economy and who were hindered 
whenever possible by the state bureaucracy to develop themselves would flourish once all the 
irrational constraints of central planning were lifted. It was also clear that transition to a market 
economy meant reallocation of labor on a large scale. If this reallocation was to be played out with 
a minimum of social tension then a social safety net providing income support for the temporarily 
unemployed had to be put in place with the launch of the reforms. We now turn to two of the actors 
and their behavior under transition starting off with new private firms. 
The new private sector was by far the most dynamic in terms of job creation. Konings, Lehmann 
and Schaffer (1996) show in a regression framework that in 1991 new private firms had a far higher 
net employment growth rate than SOEs and privatized firms. Because of this higher capacity of job 
creation and because of large entry of new firms into the market once the reform program had 
eliminated all barriers to entry private sector employment soared. The success of new private firms 
had historical roots but was also tightly linked with the “shock therapy” applied in January 1990. In 
Poland private entrepreneurship was possible in the late years of the communist regime, when 
partial (market socialist) reforms of the centrally planned economy were introduced.7 Also the 
political conflicts in the early 1980s convinced many persons to seek their luck outside the state 
sector, and these persons learned being an entrepreneur in pre-reform times. However, under market 
socialism the private sector remained restrained by economic shortages, restrictions on trade and 
many government regulations. Once the macroeconomic measures of the “shock therapy” took a 
hold, the potential of these entrepreneurs was unleashed. In particular, liberalizing imports and 
establishing current account convertibility gave important impulses. The centrally planned economy 
had left many market niches empty, into which the new private entrepreneurs could now penetrate. 
The free flow of imports helped the development of wholesale and retail trade above all, but it also 
(with a lag) benefited manufacturing and services. Of course, not all private sector activities 
survived the liberalization (especially those did not survive which only took advantage of 
distortions in the centrally planned system) but the group of experienced entrepreneurs who had 
learned their trade under difficult conditions in the 1980s and the group of new entrants in 1990 
were able to engage in profitable activities, successively filling out all the market niches that had 
been unoccupied in the centrally planned economy. 
 
Because “privatization proper” stalled in 1990 and 1991, SOEs were still the main players with 
whom the government had to deal. For the reform program to really work it was important that 
sooner or later managers of SOEs started to adjust their behavior to the new macroeconomic 
environment (Pinto, Belka and Krajewski, 1993). Some of the SOEs chose to be commercialized 
which was conceived as a first step towards privatization.8 The main difference on paper between 
SOEs and commercialized enterprises was related to corporate governance. SOEs had a workers 
council which made all important personnel and investment decisions while in commercialized 
firms the workers council was abolished and replaced by a supervisory board, with four of its 
member nominated by the Ministry of Privatization and two by the employees.  The de facto power 
in well-managed SOEs had, however, shifted to managers, which can be explained by the relative 
lack of managerial ability in Poland and the fear of rising unemployment. So, my discussion 
subsumes SOEs proper and commercialized SOEs under the term SOE. 
                                                 
7
 In Czechoslovakia and the GDR such private entrepreneurship was non-existent, in Czechoslovakaia because after the 
repression of the “Prague Spring” in 1968 no reforms to the economic system were undertaken, while in the GDR, 
being the “front state” of the Soviet camp, a rigid application of the Soviet model has always been pursued until 1985 
when Gorbachev came to power and the Soviet Union started on perestroika.  
8
 A commercialized SOE was put under the direct control of the Ministry and was supposed to be privatized within two 
years. Since in 1990 commercialized SOEs had tax advantages over SOEs many managers applied for 
commercialization. Once these tax advantages disappeared enthusiasm for commercialization dropped markedly.  
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In the first year of the reforms there was relatively little adjustment as far as SOEs were concerned. 
With adjustment I mean a more efficient use of resources expressing itself in the shedding of 
redundant labor and in a cost-conscious use of inputs, the imposition of a hard budget constraint 
internally in the firm as well as “deep restructuring”. Deep restructuring implies, for example, the 
search of new markets, the development of new product lines, the abandoning of unprofitable 
activities and the divestiture of social assets. 
 
The reasons for the inertia observed in 1990 and the first half of 1991 were manifold. First, many 
SOEs had accounts in dollars and the large devaluation of the zloty in January 1990 raised the value 
of these accounts in the domestic currency. Second, until the middle of 1991 SOEs paid for their 
inputs imported from the Soviet Union with transfer rubles not with hard currency. So, their 
production was implicitly subsidized. Third, the commercial banking sector (essentially regional 
spin-offs from the National Bank of Poland) was not very well controlled and was willing to lend 
money to SOEs without evaluating the viability of firms. Fourth, the larger than expected corrective 
inflation reduced real wage costs dramatically. Fifth, well-performing SOEs were willing to grant 
inter-firm trade credit to SOEs performing badly. All these factors were, however, temporary and 
had fizzled out in the first half of 1991. Still the rigid macroeconomic framework imposed by the 
“shock therapy” did not force a change in behavior of many SOE managers because they expected 
the government to bail out their firms if they were in trouble like it had done in the past. One of the 
great achievements of the reform team was to never give in to mounting pressures from the side of 
managers and workers to loosen the no bailout policy. None of the first three governments ever 
budged on this issue. Eventually it dawned on SOE managers that there would be no help coming 
from the government and that they would have to rely on their own devices. 
 
Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993) point to the heterogeneity of SOE performance. Within narrowly 
defined industrial sectors, some firms had engaged in “deep restructuring” and were profitable in 
the first two years of transition while others had not restructured and were financially in difficulty. 
This heterogeneity within sectors seems to imply that market forces had an impact on firms. Those 
with better initial conditions and with better managers had a superior performance. The imposition 
of a rational price system with import liberalization caused a larger jump in producer prices in 
heavy industry than in light industry. So, SOEs manufacturing heavy goods had been further away 
from world prices than SOEs manufacturing light goods. Hence, initial conditions were an 
important ingredient for the profitability of a production activity after reforms were implemented.  
Well performing SOEs were also in possession of abler managers regarding the marketing and 
selling of products. Since these SOEs also shed labor rather aggressively they improved 
productivity. In SOEs the remuneration of managers was not tied to profits but a multiple of the 
average wage in the firm. In spite of this lack of direct incentives many managers were strongly 
motivated and worked hard to improve the position of their firm. One reason for this was the 
expectation that they would gain during privatization by acquiring shares of the own firm at below-
market prices. Equally important was their reputation to them. They felt that if they did a good job 
now, even if not properly remunerated for that, they would remain as directors after privatization 
had occurred or their good reputation would allow them to find a managerial job easily given the 
scarcity of managerial talent in Poland.  
 
The upshot of these considerations is that the macroeconomic stabilization policies in conjunction 
with import liberalization eventually imposed a hard budget constraint and the rational use of 
resources, once SOE managers were convinced that no help would arrive from the state. In other 
words, initiating macroeconomic stabilization policies and sticking to their pre-determined goals 
despite immense social pressures in the end did change the microeconomic behavior of SOEs.  The 
behavior by SOE managers also implied that changing the ownership structure of industry, while 
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important in the medium run, was not that vital in the short-run. The growth of GDP that we see in 
1992 is linked to the growth of production in industry. This growth occurred because of the entry 
and the expansion of new firms but also because many of the SOEs had improved their performance 
dramatically. It was this growth of GDP that convinced the Polish public to embrace further 
economic reforms. Rovelli and Zaiceva (2011) confirm this statement by showing within an OLS 
regression that Poland and the Czech Republic are the only two countries in the transition region 
where the average respondent in the European Barometer survey evaluates the economic changes in 
the 1990s positively.  
 
The most important of these further reforms that were enacted in the late 1990s are briefly discussed 
in the next section. 
 
 
V. The four reforms at the end of the 1990s 
 
 
V.1 The health care reform of 1999 
 
This reform had above all three aspects. The first aspect is related to financing methods. Along the 
line of German “Krankenkassen”, regional health insurance companies were set up and financed 
from a national health insurance surcharge. These health insurance companies then bought health 
services from doctors and hospitals. In addition, some financing for health services was provided by 
the state, in particular for highly specialized treatment like for example, heart surgery. As a third 
source of financing the reform foresaw private payment by patients for services not covered in the 
list of health insurance companies like for example plastic surgery. The second aspect concerned 
the decentralization of health administration having the decision making located at the province 
(powiat) level and not at the regional level (województwo level) as it was before. The intention of 
this decentralization was to bring health services closer to society since persons living in a province 
could now vote for the local authorities responsible for the decisions made about their health 
services. The third leg was the independence of all health care providers. This independence was 
particularly relevant in financial terms as the health providers could decide autonomously about 
their budgets and received legal status that made them independent from the regulations of 
budgetary law. The reform thus had good modernizing intentions trying to set the financing on a 
sounder footing, giving more autonomy to health care providers and increasing the involvement of 
local citizens in the running of the system.9     
 
V.2 The administrative reform of 1999 
 
This reform introduced three levels of state administration: the region (wojewódzstwo), the 
province (powiat) and the commune (gmina). The provinces had been abolished in 1975 under 
communism and were now reintroduced, while the 49 regions that existed before the reform where 
agglomerated into 16. The reduction in the number of regions was intended to create economically 
more viable regions. At the same time within the new larger regions the self-administration bodies 
                                                 
9
 These good intentions did not all translate in good health services at the ground. This was maybe also due to the many 
modifications that the health reform was subject to. This large number of modifications have some researchers led to 
speak of a reversal of the 1999 health reform. This assessment goes probably too far, but if there is one reform that has 
not been adopted whole heartedly it is the health reform. At any rate, throughout the first decade of the new century 
there were loud complaints about poor health care, long waiting list, underpaid and overworked doctors and nurses. 
Consequently, the government under Donald Tusk enacted a new reform of the health care system in 2011, putting a 
large emphasis on a more privately run healthcare. It is too early to tell whether these reform efforts will improve Polish 
health care. 
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received more power at the expense of the president of the region (the voivod). This shifting of 
power was meant to bring more democracy to the region. The same intent of a deeper penetration of 
democratic processes was behind the reemergence of the provinces. In summary, the administrative 
reform provided more efficient but also more democratic structures of state administration.  
 
V.3 The education reform of 1999           
 
Before the reform Poland had the following system of pre-tertiary education: a comprehensive 
primary school cycle lasting 8 years, a secondary school cycle with two tracks, namely a general 
track (lyceum) lasting 4 years, or a vocational track that could last 3 years (basic vocational school) 
or 5 years (secondary vocational school). This early tracking of pupils was considered undesirable 
by the reformers who established the following sequence of pre-tertiary education: a comprehensive 
primary school lasting 6 years, a comprehensive lower secondary school of 3 years (gymnasium) 
which was followed by a tracking decision to either an academic strand (general secondary school) 
or a vocational strand (secondary vocational school). The reformers expected a better average 
performance from Poland’s pupils because of this delay in the tracking decision. In addition school 
curricula were modernized to make pupils fit for a knowledge-based economy.  
 
Polish pupils of 9th grade took part in the PISA tests of the OECD in 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009. A 
comparison of the test scores of the 2000 and 2009 cohorts is particularly interesting since the first 
group was unaffected by the reforms while the second group had definitely only studied in reformed 
schools. The mean reading score in 2000 was with 479 below the OECD average while in 2009 it 
was 500, putting Poland above the OECD average (OECD, 2010a). While the share of high 
performers increased slightly, the improvement in the mean reading score was mainly brought about 
by a statistically significant fall from 23.2 percent in the share of low performers in 2000 to 15 
percent in 2009, where low performers are defined as students with a proficiency level below 2.10 
Thus in 2009, Poland found herself below the OECD average of 18.1 percent and had the ninth 
lowest share of low performers in the world, ranking 7 places before Hungary, the next best 
transition country, and 16 places above Italy who had around 21 percent of low performers in that 
year. In addition, between 2003, when only a minority had gone through the reformed schools and 
when mathematics was also assessed, and 2009 mathematics performance improved in Poland by 5 
score points from 490 to 495, getting closer to the OECD average of 499 score points.     
 
These positive trends occurring between 2000 and 2009, i.e. after the reform was implemented, do 
not mean, of course, that we can pinpoint a causal effect of this reform on the performance of Polish 
pupils. The World Bank study by Jakubowski, Patrinos, Porta and Wiśniewski (2010) attempts to 
do this by matching students of 2006 PISA cohort with their counterparts of the 2000 cohort on 
their propensity score, i.e. their probability, to have entered vocational education as students did 
before the reform. The authors thus try to see whether those who would have entered vocational 
education under the old system benefitted from the fact that they remained one more year in general 
education. They show that this delayed entry into vocational education had a positive and 
                                                 
10
 Proficiency levels below 2 are levels 1a and 1b. We cite the description of tasks of these levels as they are given in 
OECD (2010b, p. 8): 
“Tasks at [level 1a] require the reader to locate one or more independent pieces of explicitly stated information, to 
recognize the main theme or author’s purpose in a text about a familiar topic, or to make a simple connection between 
information in the text and common, everyday knowledge. Typically the required information in the text is prominent 
and there is little, if any, competing  information.” 
“Tasks at [level 1b] require the reader to locate a single piece of explicitly stated information in a prominent position in 
a short, syntactically simple text with a familiar context and text type, such as a narrative or a simple list. The text 
typically provides support to the reader, such as repetition of information, pictures or familiar symbols. There is 
minimal competing information. In tasks requiring interpretation, the reader may need to make simple connections 
between adjacent pieces of information.” 
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significant impact on student performance since the improvement was particularly large for this 
counterfactual group of entrants into vocational education. This evaluation study still does not catch 
the overall effect of the reform on average student performance, at best it can establish an impact of 
the reform on the sub-group of those switching later to vocational education. However, since the 
core of the reform was a delayed tracking decision, the reform seems to have caused at least 
partially the improvement in student performance via the channel of those entering vocational 
education later. At any rate, the encouraging results from this reform are not in doubt, making it 
probably the modernizing reform that has been most conducive to long-run growth.         
 
V.4 The pension reform of 1999           
 
In the 1990s Poland had a pension system that she had inherited from the communist past. Because 
of demographic trends but also because of special privileges to some groups of workers the pension 
system like in many countries had great financing difficulties that needed to be addressed. Chłon, 
Góra and Rutkowski (2000) estimate that in 2020 the pension system in its unreformed version 
would have generated an annual deficit of 4% of GDP, which would be unsustainable in the long 
run. So the old-age pension system was in urgent need to be reformed. Since the early 1990s there 
was a vivid debate about which way to reform the pension system. Eventually the conviction that a 
completely new system should be introduced prevailed and the solidarity-based Buzek government 
formulated a radical reform plan which was eventually adopted by parliament. It is noteworthy that 
predecessor governments, whose principal coalition partner were the post-communists, laid the 
groundwork for the reform. The “Act on the Social Security System” and the “Act on Pensions” 
became law on January 1st, 1999.  
 
The new pension system was conceived as a multi-pillar system. The first pillar is still based on the 
pay as you go principle, while the second pillar is funded through investments. Both these pillars 
are mandatory for workers born in 1949 or later. A third funded pillar is voluntary.  The two 
mandatory pillars are based on the defined contribution principle, that is benefits are linked to 
accumulated lifetime contributions and returns based on financial returns (second funded pillar) or 
the growth of the wage bill (first pillar). When the reform was enacted the social-security 
contribution rate for old age was 19.52 percent of the gross wage, paid in equal parts by the 
employee and the employer. The contributions are collected in a centralized fashion by the Social 
Institute of Security (ZUS) and then registered on individual accounts in both pillars. At the time of 
the enactment, two thirds of the contributions were dedicated to the first pillar and one third to the 
second pillar.  
 
From the individual future pensioner’s point of view the pension reform achieved two aims: first it 
provided actuarially fair pension benefits since these benefits were tightly linked to an individual’s 
contribution, a state of affairs that was not present with the old pension system. Second it 
diversified risk since the first pillar is tied to developments in the labor market while the second and 
third pillars are tied to the capital market. The rate of return in the first pillar is linked to the growth 
rate of the covered wage bill while the rate of return in the second and third pillars are tied to the 
rate of return on investments. Empirical evidence shows that these two rates are not closely 
correlated so that paying contributions to the two types of pillars indeed implies diversification of 
risk. From the government’s point of view the reform has created a sustainable system at lower 
levels of expenditure in terms of GDP than were spent before the reform took place. This 
sustainability of the new pension system was based on its future neutrality, that is on the fact that in 
the not too distant future the present value of benefits would equal the present value of 
contributions.   
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Implementation of the new pension system meant an increase of the effective retirement age by 
around 5 years. In the 1990s average retirement age was approximately 55 for females and 59 for 
males. There existed a lot of pension privileges offering early retirement schemes, which were not 
touched by the reform. In the new system workers covered cannot retire before the nominal 
retirement age, which is 60 for females and 65 for males. Retiring early for those covered by the 
new pension regime is impossible both for legal and economic reasons. Pensions paid to early 
retirees would be extremely low since they are actuarially adjusted to the age of retirement. People 
were in general in favor of the new system, so they implicitly accepted the retirement age. These 
were rather young people, consequently they were little concerned about their own retirement. 
People born before 1949 were not affected by the changes and such left outside the discussion. 
Initially the savings were nil for the pension budget since older workers could legally retire early 
and did not bear the economic cost implied by the new system. Now, when the increase of the 
retirement age has become effective, the saving has become large, amounting to roughly 1 percent 
of GDP.   
 
To avoid protests the pension reform law was accompanied by special rules for certain types of 
workers, which foresaw generous early retirement schemes. These schemes turned out to be 
expensive to the budget, but they were also politically difficult to eliminate. It took nearly ten years 
to solve this problem, when at the end of 2008 the law on bridging pensions was finally passed by 
the Sejm. The law eliminated nearly all types of bridging schemes allowing early retirement only in 
very special cases based on purely medical decisions. The number of potential cases thus dropped to 
roughly 1/10 of the previously possible early retirement cases. Moreover, early retirement after the 
reform became conditional on earlier additional contributions paid by employers. The surviving 
bridging schemes also became limited to specific cohorts, covering only those workers who started 
working in special conditions before 1999. The law on bridging pensions is commonly considered 
the most important achievement of the first Tusk government in the legislative term of 2007-2011.11  
 
The four reforms that I have briefly described here were a set of modernizing reforms that were 
urgently required to keep the country on a strong growth path. Some of the flaws of the initial 
reform acts were later ironed out by the first Tusk government. The four big reforms were 
implemented and enacted during the tenure of a reform-friendly government, which had its roots in 
the Solidarity movement. One needs, however, also do justice to those governments, which I call 
reform-neutral, since under their stewardships the ground was often laid for the legislative acts 
pushed through by successor governments that were reform-friendly. For example, the pension 
reform was lively debated in the three left-wing governments preceding the Buzek government. 
Without this prior discussion it would have been difficult to pass the reform in the end. In my 
opinion, the continuity of economic reform ideas, which straddled the political divide and which 
resulted in reform legislation on a broad front and its fine-tuning over time, is the main factor 
explaining the astonishing growth performance of the Polish economy. 
 
VI. The Polish labor market: reforms and problems 
 
As I touched upon in the introduction, if there is one area where we cannot really speak of a good 
performance, it is the labor market; this statement at least holds until the aftermath of EU accession 
when the unemployment rate came down and employment rose rapidly (see figures 3 and 4). The 
main long-term challenge that Polish policy makers faced regarding the labor market was linked to 
                                                 
11
 A serious setback regarding the pension reform occurred when personnel of the security services (army, police, etc.) 
were taken out of the new system in 2002; the same happened to miners in 2005. Both groups were originally included 
in 1999. The second Tusk government is now trying to reverse these costly modifications, but this is a politically 
delicate and not easy task.  
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becoming a full member of the EU. Accession to the European Union has generated opportunities 
and challenges for Poland as far as the labor market is concerned. When prospects are certain that a 
country will join the EU, FDI flows become continuous and solid, creating jobs in the labor market 
of the country that accedes. This job creation will be more pronounced the better the skill profile of 
the workforce of the joining country is. Being part of an internal market permits free movement of 
labor in principle often easing the demographic pressures on the domestic labor market. Outward 
migration might, however, also result in “brain drain” depriving a new member state (NMS) of 
those sections of the workforce that are especially vital for productivity growth. However, the main 
challenge of EU membership consists in ensuring that the labor market becomes competitive in a 
broad sense. If we think about being competitive from the labor demand side, this implies that labor 
market institutions, regulations in general and the tax system all need to be shaped in such a way as 
to boost the willingness of firms to create jobs. When we focus on the supply side, reforms need to 
have at least a two-fold thrust to ensure that the workforce in the new member state is competitive 
with workers elsewhere in the union. First, skill levels of workers need to be developed in tune with 
the demand of domestic but also of multinational firms if a country wants to claim a decent place in 
the international production chain.  Second, the social benefit system has to be structured in such a 
way as to target those who really need help and, at the same time, ensure that the incentives are 
pushing workers to prefer work over unemployment or inactivity. 
   
Changing the behavior of workers and firms is a long-term process and Poland, like most of the 
NMS, has spent nearly a decade before accession to the EU to improve the performance of her labor 
market by reforming her institutions. Poland had to manage the reforms in the labor market in such 
a way that they ensured a transition as smooth as possible from an economy closed to world 
markets to one integrated in world markets (and in particular in EU markets). As we can see from 
figures 3 and 4 accession seemed to have given a boost to employment and to have lowered 
unemployment in Poland, but this boost only occurred because Poland has been successful, at least 
partially, in restructuring her economy and in reallocating labor from declining to expanding firms 
and sectors increasing labor productivity in a genuine fashion and not just by labor shedding 
(Rutkowski, 2007). We should also note that the years following accession were years of a booming 
world economy. It is, therefore, very difficult to disentangle the causal effect of accession on 
employment growth. 
VI.1 The structure of labor market states and their trends  
  
We shall look at participation, employment and unemployment rates as well as the incidence of 
long-term unemployment in Poland12 comparing the Polish numbers to EU-15 averages. We use 
four data points (1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007) in our analysis and disaggregate these data by gender, 
education and age and thus go behind the aggregates of figures 3 and 4.  
 
The participation rates in Poland are lower than in EU-15. This comes about because of lower rates 
of the young (15-24) and of older workers (55-64). The young in Poland in the period 1998-2007 
had a relatively constant participation rate of 10 percent compared to an average rate of 35 percent 
in EU-15, while the number for the older workers are 32 percent and 49 percent respectively. The 
difference in the participation rate is particularly striking for persons with lower education 
                                                 
12
 The Working Age Population – WAP - (on paper, women: 15-60 years of age, men: 15-65 years of age) can be 
decomposed in three states: employment (E), unemployment (U) and inactivity (I). The labor force (LF) equals the sum 
of those who have a job plus those who do want to have a job but do not have one and search for one: LF = E+ U. The 
participation rate is then LF/WAP, the employment rate E/LF, and the unemployment rate U/L. Long-term 
unemployment (LTU) is defined as those workers with a continuous unemployment spell of more than a year. The 
incidence of long-term unemployment is the share of the long-term unemployed in total unemployment: LTU/U. 
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attainment (pre-primary, primary and lower secondary), falling in the Polish case from 38 percent to 
29 percent between 1998 and 2007 and rising in the EU-15 case from 55 percent to 59 percent in 
the same period. The particularly low activity rate of the young could be caused by several 
developments: more involvement of young workers in the informal sector, the unwillingness of the 
low skilled young to enter the labor market at all, longer spells in full-time education or relatively 
few opportunities of part-time employment. Many older workers with low educational attainment 
find it particularly difficult to adjust to the new conditions, thus they might become “discouraged 
workers” and withdraw from the labor market. 
 
The overall employment rate in Poland fell continuously from about 75 percent in 1989 to 55 
percent in 2003 (figure 3). This strong downward trend is tightly linked to the aggressive labor 
shedding that took place in this period. In the aftermath of the 1998 crisis in Russia we see a 
particularly large “shake-out” of unproductive labor taking place in enterprises. That it is a “shake-
out” of low productivity labor can be inferred by the strong rise of the average real wage in 1999, 
the year after the Russian crisis (figure 2). With accession the employment rate rose continuously 
until the world financial crisis stopped this upward trend. The low employment rates for Poland that 
we see in figure 3 are in particular driven by lower rates for older workers and less educated 
workers. For older workers they are about 10 percentage lower than in EU-15, where they reach 
about 40 percent. Workers with less education are much less employed in Poland, and in all other 
NMS for that matter, than in EU-15. Their employment rates in Poland were around 30 percent 
throughout the period, roughly 20 percentage points lower than in EU-15.  
 
The unemployment rates were much higher in Poland than in other CEE economies and in EU-15 in 
most years of the reported period. Slicing the data by gender we see no discernible difference. The 
fall in the unemployment rate that accelerated in the years after accession can be explained by 
outward migration but also by large increases in hiring. The incidence of Polish long-term 
unemployment was around 50 percent since the late nineties and about 10 percentage points higher 
than in EU-15, pointing to the great difficulties of the unemployed to flow out of this state.  
 
In summary, the least skilled among young and older withdraw from the labor market to a much 
larger degree than this happens in the EU-15. This withdrawal can be explained by the inability or 
the unwillingness of these workers to adapt to the new labor market conditions during the transition 
process. Those older workers and workers with low education who remain in the labor market find 
less employment opportunities than their counterparts in the old member states. The age group most 
affected by unemployment is the young like in the EU-15, the youth unemployment rates are, 
however, substantially higher in Poland. Successive Polish government promoted active measures 
for the young to fight this high youth unemployment. A rigorous evaluation of these schemes has to 
my knowledge not been undertaken. Finally, long-term unemployment is more severe in Poland. 
How Polish policy makers dealt with older workers and less educated workers as “problem groups” 
we shall see below.   
 
    
VI.2 Labor Market Institutions and Labor Market Reforms in Poland 
 
Students of the labor markets in the NMS often have opposing views on how flexible these markets 
have become. While Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) state that labor markets institutions in the NMS 
point to relative flexibility, Rutkowski (2007) maintains that their labor markets have still been rigid 
in the first decade of the new century. These contradictory assessments come about because the 
authors use different benchmarks for comparison. Boeri and Garibaldi compare the institutions of 
the NMS labor markets with those of EU-15, while Rutkowski pursues the idea that the only viable 
benchmark should be the labor market institutions of the Anglo-Saxon countries. In my opinion this 
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preference of the latter author is more based on ideology than facts since if we take a longer-term 
view the superior performance of the very flexible Anglo-Saxon labor markets is not certain. In 
addition, labor legislation that is relevant for accession states has to be seen embedded in the EU 
social charter and in EU policies of social protection and inclusion. Consequently, it seems more 
plausible to compare labor market institutions of the NMS impacting on flexibility with institutions 
as they are prevalent in the EU-15.  A sensible way to analyze the reform of labor market 
institutions is to divide the assessment into factors that predominantly impact on labor demand and 
into factors that mainly influence labor supply.  
 
As far as labor demand is concerned we look at three factors: employment protection legislation 
(EPL), the role of unions in collective bargaining and taxes on labor. The EPL overall index 
developed by OECD researchers is a weighted composite index made up of three separate indices, 
the indices for regular contracts, for temporary contracts and for collective dismissals. The index for 
regular contracts in Poland is slightly lower than for EU-15, while the index for temporary 
employment is substantially lower in Poland. The one index where the Polish index is larger than 
the EU-15 index relates to collective dismissals. Since temporary employment in Poland amounts to 
roughly a quarter of all employment and since collective dismissals were rare, on the measure of 
EPL the Polish labor market exhibits more flexibility than the labor markets of EU-15. Important 
statistics for collective bargaining are union density and union coverage: both these statistics are 
much lower in Poland than in EU-15; union density in 2006 was 16 percent in Poland and about 39 
percent in EU-15. Essentially in Poland, we see a near collapse of the influence of trade unions in 
the Polish economy, a development not necessarily beneficial.13 Union coverage, that is the fraction 
of workers to whom a collective agreement applies, is much lower in Poland (35 percent in 2006) 
than in EU-15 (81 percent in 2006).  So, also on this measure the Polish labor market seems much 
more flexible than the labor markets of EU-15. Finally, the implicit tax rate14on labor is somewhat 
lower in Poland than in EU-15. In summary, from a demand perspective, institutional reforms have 
made the Polish labor market more flexible than the labor markets in the old member states.  
 
Turning to the factors that influence labor supply we look at three factors: unemployment benefits, 
non-employment benefits like early retirement schemes and disability pensions, as well as the 
evolution of wage inequality from early to late transition. 
 
In Poland the unemployment benefit system has undergone dramatic changes over the 1990’s. With 
rising unemployment, these changes were often dictated by budget considerations. However, as 
policy makers became aware of the disincentive effects of a too generous unemployment benefit 
system, changes in legislation also reflected attempts to increase the willingness of the unemployed 
to increase search and take on jobs. At the beginning of transition, Polish unemployment benefits 
were earnings related, open ended and without a previous work requirement, causing a flooding of 
offices of the Public Employment Services by applicants for benefits.  Within a year, 
unemployment insurance benefits were limited to one year and a previous work requirement was 
imposed. By December 1994 earnings related benefits were eliminated and a flat rate amounting to 
                                                 
13The idea that the main impact of trade unions is the “destruction of jobs” in a firm, sector or the economy, is not 
shared by all students of trade unions. Applying Albert Hirshman’s concept of “exit” and “voice” to trade unions, some      
economists maintain that trade unions can give “voice” to workers’ concerns about inefficiencies that they observe 
regarding production and organization in a firm; as a consequence the existence of trade unions might actually increase 
the efficiency in the labor market. Other researchers have pointed to the large transactions costs that arise in the case of 
bargaining at the individual level in large firms. Trade unions can clearly reduce these transaction costs.  
14
 The implicit tax rate on employed labor is defined as the sum of all direct and indirect taxes and employees' and 
employers' social contributions levied on employed labor income divided by the total compensation of employees 
working in the economic territory increased by taxes on wage bill and payroll. 
26 
 
36% of the average wage was introduced.15 Thus within a few years, major aspects of the 
unemployment benefit system were overhauled by the Polish government with an eye on both 
reducing budgetary pressures as well as increasing the search effectiveness of the unemployed. 
Relative to EU-15 the level of unemployment benefits has become not very generous; especially for 
the long-term unemployed income support is very limited and since it is provided by cash-starved 
municipalities often only on paper. So, clearly the Polish unemployment benefit system as it is now 
should create few disincentive effects to search for work.  
 
As we have seen, activity and employment rates of older and less skilled workers have been low 
from the early nineties until 2007. Polish policy makers strongly contributed to the withdrawal of 
older workers by introducing an array of measures that spurred these workers on to retire long 
before the statutory retirement age. Throughout the nineties invalidity and disability pensions were 
the main income support measure for these workers. Comparisons with OECD countries show that 
while the fraction of workers with impaired ability to work16 was roughly the same in Poland and 
other OECD countries in the 1990’s, Poland, in 1999, had 182 persons in 1000 who received an 
invalidity pension in the age bracket 45-54, while the average in the OECD was 73 persons in 1000. 
The pension reform enacted in 1999 reduced the inflow of new disability pension claimants. With 
an economy deteriorating in 1999, this reduced inflow was completely compensated by an increased 
inflow of early retirees. The majority of these early retirees have been unemployed workers who 
were still in working age. Thus increasing expenditures on the early retirement of unemployed 
workers was a consciously chosen policy to “deactivate” a substantial part of the unemployed. For 
example, in the years 2003-2004, 40% of unemployed between the ages of 55-64 were given early 
retirement packages, while for the age groups 45-54 and 15-44 the percentages were 19% and 11% 
respectively. Since early retirement schemes were considered passive labor market policy measures, 
these pensions were paid out of the Labor Fund (LF). While in 1997 6.4% of LF expenditures were 
destined for early retirement pensions, in 1999 this share was already 20.3%, reaching 47.2% in 
2004. Thus, the increase in expenditures on early retirement pensions did not only push older Polish 
workers out of the labor force, it also crowded out expenditures on active labor market policies. 
Only the discussed reforms of the Tusk government in 2008 have nearly entirely eliminated these 
bridging schemes.  
 
By providing strong income support for older workers intent on withdrawing from the labor market 
Polish governments clearly encouraged such behavior. In times of a sustained up-turn, some of 
these workers might have been in demand. A too generous early retirement policy might, therefore, 
in some sense “overshoot” the target of downsizing the workforce and be very inefficient in the 
medium run. On the other hand, as already stated, from a political and social point of view this large 
downsizing of the workforce in times of prolonged and large-scale labor shedding might be the only 
way to ensure enough social cohesion. So, the “deactivation” of older workers or workers who are 
unwilling to adjust to the new labor market conditions generated a major trade-off for Polish policy 
makers. On the one hand, “deactivation” is required in times of large excess supply of labor to 
avoid social turmoil. On the other hand, “deactivation” is difficult to reverse in times of excess 
labor demand, which occurred in the years 2004-2007 when the world economy boomed. To find 
the right level of “deactivated” workers and avoid overshooting this level is a difficult task that 
Polish policy makers did not resolve satisfactorily. 
 
The success of the educational reform can also be established by looking how it impacts on the 
distribution of wages. Under central planning the wage distribution in Poland was compressed 
                                                 
15
 Those without previous employment were entitled to benefits close to the minimum wage! 
16
 Having impaired ability to work does not mean, of course, that persons with such an affliction are completely unable 
to work.   
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reflecting low returns to education. In table 2 we can see the evolution of the distribution of wages 
for Poland and compare this evolution to the wage structures in France and the United States. For 
Poland, we see a steep increase in the ratio of the 9th to the 1st decile, and a relative mild increase in 
the ratio of the median to the 1st decile between 1992 and 2006. It is striking that over the same 
period the median worker gains relatively little to the worker in the first decile. In other words, the 
large rise in inequality is mainly caused by gains in the upper part of the distribution, i.e. because 
highly skilled workers are compensated for the acquisition of skills.  What is also striking is the rise 
in the incidence of low pay to roughly one quarter of all employed by the year 2004. Poland thus 
reaches the same low pay incidence as exhibit the United States, one of the OECD countries with 
the highest fraction of low pay workers. The United States also has one of the most flexible labor 
markets in the developed world with a relatively unequal distribution of earnings during the 1990’s 
and in the new century. At the time of accession, Poland has a slightly less unequal distribution than 
the United States. Strikingly, France shows the most equal distribution of earnings among the three 
countries with far lower ratios of the median to the 1st decile and of the 9th to the 1st decile.  Thus, 
the evolution of the earnings distribution allows us to draw the conclusion that in late transition 
Poland had wages that seem to be correlated with the relative scarcity of labor skills and that as far 
as the structure of remuneration is concerned the Polish labor market is closer to the labor market of 
the U.S. than to other continental European labor markets.  
 
In summary, from the demand side the Polish labor market has become more flexible than the EU-
15 labor markets. Looking at factors impacting on the supply, the unemployment benefit system has 
become non-generous and has eliminated the disincentives to search for a job. At the same time for 
nearly two decades there existed large scale bridging schemes that “deactivated” older and low-
skilled workers.  Well educated workers can command relatively high wages while there is a large 
section of the workforce employed in low paid jobs. Compared to most continental European labor 
markets the Polish labor market has thus become very flexible and responsive to the needs of Polish 
firms, which via a tortuous and long way of shedding unproductive labor and of restructuring have 
become competitive in world and EU markets.   
 
VII. Conclusions  
            
The impressive growth performance of the Polish economy since 1992 is intimately related to the 
persistence of reform efforts by successive Polish governments over two decades. These reform 
efforts occurred despite a relative fractured and unstable political landscape in the 1990s. Large 
reform packages were implemented by the Mazowiecki government at the beginning of the 
transition to a market economy and by the Buzek government at the turn of the 21st century. Both 
these government were located at the right and center of the political spectrum as were the other 
governments that implemented important reforms. The success of the reforms was possible because 
of a virtuous cycle: right-center governments adopted reforms, which imposed costs in the short-run 
to large sections of the population. As a consequence, the right-center governments were voted out 
of office and left leaning governments took over. However, these left leaning governments did not 
reverse any of the reforms of their predecessors thus ensuring that the reforms could produce 
positive effects that inclined a majority of Poles to vote for a right-center coalition in the next 
voting cycle, i.e. for a reform-friendly government. Among policy makers responsible for economic 
issues there existed a broad consensus about the general reform path that Poland had to take 
independent of party affiliation. So, while left leaning governments did not enact major reform 
projects they did prepare the enactment by leading the discussion of reforms projects in the public 
and in the legislative bodies.  
 
Painting with a broad brush, we have three large blocks of reforms occurring in the two decades 
since the communists relinquished power. We have the large block of reforms of the Mazowiecki 
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government, spearheaded by the group of economists around Leszek Balcerowicz, which stabilized 
the economy and put it on its path to a market oriented economy. The second block are the large 
modernizing reforms of the Buzek government, while the first Tusk government fine-tuned some of 
these earlier reforms. Of course, other governments also enacted reforms, individually of lesser 
importance, but their sum contributing to the modernization of the Polish economy to the same 
degree. 
 
The modernization of the Polish economy involved the restructuring of SOEs and privatized firms 
implying large labor shedding and the “shake-out” of workers unproductive in the new demand 
constrained economic environment. This tortuous and prolonged process released many persons 
who had great difficulties in finding re-employment, above all older and less skilled workers. 
Successive Polish governments were not able to re-integrate these workers into employment, and 
chose to “deactivate” a large fraction of them by granting them relatively generous disability or 
early retirement pensions. So, when one hails the great growth performance of the Polish economy 
and the implementation of a consistent reform agenda by Polish policy makers as its underlying 
cause, one should not ignore that for more than a decade a substantial fraction of the Polish 
workforce did not actively participate in the economic life of the country.      
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FIGURES 
Macroeconomic indicators of transition countries, old member states of European Union and 
the United States  
 
Figure 1. GDP dynamics in Poland, CEE; CIS, EU-15, and US  
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Notes: Unweighted averages for CEE; CIS and EU-15. The data are taken from EBRD and OECD databases. 
CEE= Central and Eastern Europe; CIS=Commonwealth of Independent States; EU-15=15 old member 
states of European Union, US=United States. 
 
Figure 2.  Poland - Dynamics of labor productivity and real wages (as % of 1989)  
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Sources: Polish Statistical Office, IMF and World Economic Outlook Database  
Notes: Labor productivity=GDP (in 2000 prices)/employment (end of year); 
            Real wages (in 2000 prices). 
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Figure 3. Employment-to-population ratios in Poland, CEE, CIS, EU-15, and US. 
Employment ratio (15-59 y.o.)
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Notes: 15-64 for EU-15 and 16-64 for US. Unweighted averages for TEs and EU-15.  
The data are taken from TRANSMONEE and OECD databases.  
 
Figure 4. Unemployment rates in Poland, CEE; CIS, EU-15, and US. 
LFS unemployment rate
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Notes: Unweighted averages for TEs and EU-15. The data are taken from TRANSMONEE and OECD 
databases. 
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Figure 5. A supply constrained Economy and Corrective Inflation 
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Figure 6. Taxonomy of Economic Reform in a Transition Context – The Time Dimension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price liberalization 
Trade liberalization 
Macroeconomic stabilization 
 
 
Privatization 
Social safety net and income support for the unemployed 
Tax reform 
Creation of a decentralized private banking system and 
financial sector 
Pension reform 
Educational reform 
 
 
Systemic reforms: 
Reforming the labor market 
Generating a business-friendly environment that also 
encourages competition 
Generating a commercial law structure 
Generating a civil code 
 t 
34 
 
Table 1. Polish governments and their most important legislation regarding the economic sphere   
Government 
(Name of prime 
minister) 
Reform and description Act: name and short description Act 
passed on announced took effect 
on 
TadeuszMazowiecki Balcerowicz Plan  
The preparations of the Plan started in September 1989. It consisted of 10 Acts, which were passed and 
signed in December. 
 
The Act abolished the principle under which, 
unprofitable state-owned companies were financed 
from budget and allowed state-owned companies to 
declare bankruptcy. 
Act on Financial Economy of State-owned Companies 
(Ustawa z dnia 27 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie w 
Ustawie o Gospodarce Finansowej Przedsiębiorstw 
Państwowych), (Dz. U. 1989 nr 74, poz 437) 
27.12.1989 30.12.1989 01.01.1990 
The Act prohibited the central bank to finance the 
budget deficit and issue unlimited amount of 
money. 
Act on Bank law and National Bank of Poland 
(Ustawa z dnia 28 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie ustaw 
Prawo bankowe i o Narodowym Banku Polskim), (Dz. 
U. 1989 nr 74, poz. 439 z dn. 30.12.1989) 
28.12.1989 30.12.1989 01.01.1990 
The Act abolished preferential loans for state-
owned companies and tied interest rates to inflation 
rates. 
Act on Credits (Ustawa z dnia 28 grudnia 1989 r. o 
uporządkowaniu stosunków kredytowych), (Dz. U. 
1989, nr 74, poz. 440) 
28.12.1989 30.12.1989 01.01.1990 
The Act introduced tax on extensive wage growth 
(so called popiwek). 
Act on Taxation of Excessive Wage Growth (Ustawa z 
dnia 27 grudnia 1989 r. o opodatkowaniu wzrostu 
wynagrodzeń w 1990 roku, (Dz. U. 1989, nr 74, poz. 
438 z dn. 30.12.1989) 
 
27.12.1989 30.12.1989 01.01.1990 
The Act uniformed tax rule for all sectors of the 
economy. 
Act on the New Rules of Taxation (Ustawa z dnia 28 
grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw 
regulujących zasady opodatkowania), (Dz. U. 1989, nr 
74, poz. 443 z dn. 30.12.1990) 
 
28.12.1989 30.12.1989 01.01.1990 
The Act allowed companies with foreign capital to 
repatriate their profits and exempted them from 
paying the tax levied on extensive wage growth. 
The Act obligated those enterprises to sell foreign 
currencies to the state. The exchange rate was set by 
the central bank. 
Act of Economic Activity of Foreign Investors 
(Ustawa z dnia 28 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie ustawy o 
zasadach prowadzenia na terytorium Polskiej 
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej działalności gospodarczej 
w zakresie drobnej wytwórczości przez zagraniczne 
osoby prawne i fizyczne oraz ustawy o działalności 
gospodarczej z udziałem podmiotów zagranicznych.), 
(Dz. U. 1989, nr 74, poz. 442 z dnia 30.12.1989). 
28.12.1989 30.12.1989 01.01.1990 
The Act introduced internal convertibility of the 
złoty, abolished the state monopoly in international 
trade and obligated companies to sell foreign 
currencies to the state. 
Act on Foreign Currency (Ustawa z dnia 28 grudnia 
1989 r. o zmianie ustawy – Prawo dewizowe), (Dz. U. 
1989, nr 74, poz. 441 z dnia 30.12.1989) 
 
28.12.1989 30.12.1989 01.01.1990 
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The Act introduced the same customs law for every 
business entity. 
Act on Customs Law (Ustawa z dnia 28 grudnia 1989 
r. – Prawo celne), (Dz. U. nr 75, poz. 445 z dnia 
31.12.1989) 
 
28.12.1989 31.12.1989 01.01.1990 
The Act regulated the responsibilities of 
unemployment agencies. 
Act on Employment (Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1989 r. 
o zatrudnieniu), (Dz. U. 1989, nr 75, poz. 446 z dnia 
31.12.1989). 
 
29.12.1989 31.12.1989 31.12.1989 
Act guaranteed severance pay and temporary 
unemployment benefits for those who lost their 
jobs. 
Act on Special Circumstances of Laying off Workers 
(Ustawa z dnia 28 grudnia 1989 r. o szczególnych 
zasadach rozwiązywania z pracownikami stosunków 
pracy z przyczyn dotyczących zakładu pracy oraz o 
zmianie niektórych ustaw), (Dz. U. 1990, nr 4, poz. 19 
z dnia 27.01.1990) 
 
28.12.1989 27.01.1990 27.01.1990 
In this period, three more acts strictly connected with the Plan were passed.  
The Act specified ways of privatizations and 
conditions under which it can be conducted.  
Act on Privatization of State-owned companies 
(Ustawa z dnia 13 lipca 1990 r. o prywatyzacji 
przedsiębiorstw państwowych.), (Dz. U. 1990, nr 51, 
poz. 298 z dnia 01.08.1990) 
13.07.1990 01.08.1990 01.08.1990 
Dito (Ustawa z dnia 13 lipca 1990 r. o utworzeniu Ministra 
Przekształceń Własnościowych), (Dz. U. 1990, nr 51 
poz. 299 z dnia 01.08.1990) 
13.07.1990 01.08.1990 01.08.1990 
The Act abolished the state monopoly in insurance 
services. 
Act on Insurances (Ustawa z dnia 28 lipca 1990 r. o 
działalności ubezpieczeniowej), (Dz. U. 1990, nr 59, 
poz. 344 z dnia 28.08.1990) 
28.07.1990 28.08.1990 28.08.1990 
Krzysztof Bielecki Taxation development 
 
The government passed three acts on taxation in 
Poland. Acts introduced Personal Income Tax and 
specified regulations on Corporate Income Tax, 
local charges and other types of taxes (property tax 
etc.). 
 
Act on Personal Income Tax (Ustawa z dnia 26 lipca 
1991 r. o podatku dochodowym od osób fizycznych), 
(Dz. U. 1991, nr 80 poz. 350 z dnia 10.09.1991)  
26.07.1991 10.09.1991 01.01.1992 
Act on Taxes and Local Charges (Ustawa z dnia 12 
stycznia  1991 r. o podatkach i opłatach lokalnych), 
(Dz. U. 1991, nr 9, poz.31 z dnia 30.01.1991) 
12.01.1991 30.01.1991 30.01.1991 
Act on Corporate Income Tax (Obwieszczenie 
Ministra Finansów z dnia 3 czerwca 1991 r. w sprawie 
ogłoszenia jednolitego tekstu ustawy z dnia 31 
stycznia 1989 r. o podatku dochodowym od osób 
prawnych.), (Dz.U. 1991, nr 49, poz. 216 z dnia 
11.06.1991) 
03.06.1991 11.06.1991 11.06.1991 
Jan Olszewski      
Waldemar Pawlak I      
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Hann Suchocka Introducing Value Added Tax and Excise Tax 
First steps to introduce VAT were taken by the 
Government of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki but the Act 
was rejected by the Sejm. On 30th April 1992 started 
the preparations on new act (Government of Jan 
Olszewski). The Act was submittedto the Sejm in 
June 1992 and passed on 8th January 1993. 
Act on VAT and Excise Tax (Ustawa z dnia 8 stycznia 
1993 r. o podatku od towarów i usług oraz o podatku 
akcyzowym), (Dz. U. 1993, nr 11, poz. 50) 
08.01.1993  05.07.1993 
Privatization Program (Program Powszechnej 
Prywatyzacji) 
The new Act introduced regulations on National 
Investment Funds. 
Every citizen of Poland received special personal 
voucher. Those vouchers could have been 
exchanged into shares of companies, which were 
part of National Investment Funds. 
Duration of the Program was planned for the years 
1994 to 1998. 
Act on National Investment Funds and their 
privatization (Ustawa z dnia 30 kwietnia 1993 r. o 
narodowych funduszach inwestycyjnych i ich 
prywatyzacji), (Dz. U. 1993, nr 44, poz. 202) 
30.04.1993  13.06.1993 
Waldemar Pawlak II Strategy for Poland (Strategia dla Polski) 
Main assumptions can be found in citation given in 
the following footnote17: 
The Strategy was being implemented till 1997 by 
three following governments (The second 
Government of WaldemarPawlak, the Government 
of Józef Oleksy and Government of Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz). In all of those governments the 
Minister of Finance was Grzegorz Kołodko (one of 
the authors of the Strategy). 
The Strategy did not assume introducing big changes 
in law. 
   
Redenomination 
Already in 1989, there was first conception of 
redenomination. On 17th July 1990, the Head of 
National Bank informed about this idea. From 
December 1990 to February 1992 first banknotes 
and coins were issued but because of forgeries in 
1992 and 1993, new security feature had to be 
introduced18. 
Act on Redenomination (Ustawa z dnia 7 lipca 1994 r. 
o denominacji złotego), (Dz. U. 1994 nr 84 poz. 386) 
07.07.1994  01.01.1995 
                                                 
17Grzegorz W. Kołodko,Strategy for Poland, in: Working Papers, Institute of Finance, No 40, 1993. (http://www.tiger.edu.pl/kolodko/working/if/IF_working_papers_nr40.pdf) 
 
18www.muzhp.pl (Muzeum Historii Polski) 
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The Act on Redenomination was passed on 7th July 
1994. 
Józef Oleksy      
Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz 
     
Jerzy Buzek Pension System Reform – introduction of new, 
actuarially fair old-age pensions system that 
replaced ineffective defined-benefit system. The 
new system consists of 3 pillars:  the PAYG system 
managed by FUS (Social Insurance Fund managed 
by ZUS), the capital pillar managed by Open Old-
Age Pensions Funds (OFEs) and voluntary 
individual retirement savings. The contribution rate 
was set at 19,22% (7% for OFE), paid in equal parts 
by employees and employers. The new system is 
compulsory (with some exceptions) for all non-
farmers born in 1949 and later. Some occupational 
groups (i.e. miners or police officers) remained 
privileged. There is also a separated pension system 
for soldiers.  
 
The second big pension system in Poland is for 
farmers and their families and is managed by KRUS 
(KasaRolniczegoUbezpieczeniaSpołecznego). They 
pay very little pension contribution, receive smaller 
benefits and the whole system is practically 
financed by the state budget. 
Act on the Social Security System 
(Ustawa z dnia 13 października 1998 r. o systemie 
ubezpieczeń społecznych), (Dz. U. 1998 nr 137 poz. 
887 z dnia 10 listopada 1998 r.),  
 
13.10.1998  01.01.1999 
Act on Pensions  
(Ustawa z dnia 17 grudnia 1998 o emeryturach i 
rentach z Funduszu Ubezpieczeń Społecznych), (Dz. 
U. 1998 nr 162 poz. 1118) 
17.12.1998  01.01.1999 
 
Education System Reform 
 
Act on Education System 
(Ustawa z dnia 8 stycznia 1999 r. – Przepisy 
wprowadzające reformę ustroju szkolnego), (Dz. U. 
1999 nr 12, poz. 96) 
08.01.1999  27.02.1999 
Health Care System Reform 
Health Care System decentralization 
 
Act on Change in Public Health Care System 
(Ustawa z dnia 3 grudnia 1999 r. o zmianie ustawy o 
powszechnym ubezpieczeniu zdrowotnym), (Dz. U. 
1999 nr 109, poz. 1236) 
03.12.1999 29.12.1999 29.12.1999 
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Administration Reform 
Introduction of 3-Stage administrative division of 
the country (gmina, powiat, województwo). New 
administrative division was valid since 1st January 
1999.The number of województwa was reduced 
from 49 to 16. 
Act on Administrative Division of Poland 
(Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 1998 r. o wprowadzeniu 
trójstopniowego podziału terytorialnego państwa), 
(Dz. U. 1998 nr 96 poz. 603) 
24.07.1998 28.07.1998 28.07.1998 
Leszek Miller  Hausner Plan (Plan Hausnera) 
The Hausner Plan was a package of acts. Its aim 
was to improve the condition of public sector 
finances. The Plan assumed inter alia: changes in 
pension and benefit valorization, reform of the 
Agricultural Social Insurance Fund (KRUS), 
reorganizing sickness and disability benefits, 
imposing higher social insurance contribution 
requirements on the self employment, pushing up 
the retirement age for women to 65. 
Despite the fact that the Government of 
MarekBelka continued implementation of the Plan, 
the largest part of it was newer introduced. 
    
Marek Belka I      
Marek Belka      
Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz 
The government started preparation of the Public 
Finance Reform and changes in taxation. The 
Minister of Finance was ZytaGilowska (from 22th 
September 2006 to 7th September 2007), a former 
member of PO. 
    
Jarosław Kaczyński The preparations of Reform were continued. The 
Minister of Finance was again ZytaGilowska (from 
10th September 2007 to 16th November 2007). 
The Program of the Reforms assumed inter alia: 
 The consolidation of the public sector and 
local government budgets; 
 Removal of all special-purpose funds 
handled by local governments; 
 Transparency in the spending of public 
funds; 
 Introduction of the audit at central 
institutions and larger local governmental 
units; 
 The reduction of disability and survivals’ 
pension contribution (składkarentowa), 
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(first reduction on 1st July 2007, second 
one on 1st January 2008) 
 The treatment of EU funds as state budget 
revenue; 
Donald Tusk I The government passed on 27th August 2009 Act 
on Public Sector Finances. 
The Act scrapped most of central and local 
governmental budget unities. It obligated the 
government to prepare Multi-year National 
Financial Plans spanning four years and an official 
budget of EU funds. The Act retains also three 
safety thresholds for the public debt (at 50%, 55% 
and 60% of GDP) which trigger mandatory fiscal 
adjustment. 
In 2010 the amendment for the Act was passed. 
The amendment introduced expenditure rule. 
According to that rule, discretionary and new fixed 
expenditures may not grow by more than 1% in real 
term annually. The next change was introduction of 
medium-term planning, also in local governments. 
The amendment introduced also an additional 
mechanism for protecting public finances through 
the introduction of conditional VAT rate rises. 
Act on Public Sector Finances (Ustawa z dnia 27 
sierpnia 2009 r. o finansach publicznych), (Dz. U. Nr 
157 poz. 1240) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27.08.2009 24.09.2009 01.01.2010  
The abolition of early retirement privilege for some 
occupational groups and introduction of old-age 
pensions paid to older workers, who retired before 
the standard retirement age (bridge benefit). 
 
Reduction of the part of old-age pension 
contribution of the second, capital pillar (OFEs) 
from 7% to 3,5% percent (the reduction for the first 
few years is bigger). This part of SSC will be used 
to pay current old-age pensions but can be inherited, 
just like the money in OFEs. Introduction of higher 
limits on investing in stocks for OFEs. 
Act on Bridge Benefis (Ustawa z dnia 19 grudnia 2008 
r. o emeryturach pomostowych), (Dz. U. 2008 nr 237 
poz. 1656) 
 
 
 
Act on Change in Pension System (Ustawa z dnia 25 
marca 2011 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw związanych 
z funkcjonowaniem systemu ubezpieczeń 
społecznych), (Dz. U. 2011 nr 75 poz.398) 
 
19.12.2008 
 
 
25.03.2011 
31.12.2008 
 
 
08.04.2011 
01.01.2009 
 
 
01.05.2011 
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Raising the VAT rates up by 1 percentage 
point(from 7 to 8 percent and from 22 to 23 percent) 
Act on changes on acts connected with 
implementation of budget act(Ustawa z dnia 26 
listopada 2010 r. o zmianie niektórych ustaw 
związanych z realizacją ustawy budŜetowej), (Dz. U. 
2010 nr 238 poz. 1578) 
26.11.2010 17.12.2010 01.01.2011 
Donald Tusk II Introduction of tax on selected fossils (silver and 
copper) (budget) 
Raising up the disability and survival pension 
contribution (składkarentowa) by 2 percentage 
points (budget) 
Pushing up the retirement age of men and women to 
67 years (in 2020 for males and 2040 for females) 
(expose) 
Reduction of old-age pension privileges of selected 
state employees, mainly the police, prison guards 
etc. (expose) 
Plans of changes in the money transfers between 
FUS (Social Insurance Fund, managed by ZUS), 
state budget and OFEs 
(OtwarteFunduszeEmerytalne, Open Old-Age 
Pension Funds, the companies managing the part of 
old-age pension contributions in the second, capital 
pillar): since 1999, the whole old-age pension 
contributions have been collected by ZUS and a part 
of it has been transferred monthly to OFEs (in cash 
or more precisely- as bank transfers). The state 
budget transfers money in this amounth back to 
ZUS. Minister of Administration and IT 
Development (Ministerstwo Administracji i 
Cyfryzacji) is working on introduction of long-term 
state bonds (pension bonds) that should replace 
money transfers to OFEs, so as to reduce the 
borrowing needs of the state and, consequently, also 
public sector deficit and public debt.  
Project of Budget Act for 2012 
Projekt Ustawy budŜetowej na rok 2012, przyjęty 
przez Radę Ministrów 6.12.2011,  
 
Expose of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, 18.11.2011 
http://www.premier.gov.pl/files/download/5678.pdf 
   
 
Sources: http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/; www.money.pl; www.pb.pl; www.obserwatorfinansowy.pl; www.gazeta.pl; www.wikipedia.pl;www.premier.gov.pl. 
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Table 2. Evolution of dispersion of wages: France, Poland and United States 
 
Time  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Country          
France Low Pay Incidence* .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
 Decile 5/Decile 1 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,6 1,5 1,5 1,5 .. 
 Decile 9/Decile 1 3,2 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,0 3,0 3,0 .. 
 Decile 9/Decile 5 2,0 1,9 1,9 1,9 2,0 2,0 2,0 .. 
Poland Low Pay Incidence* 14,3 17,6 18,4 18,8 .. 22,1 23,5 .. 
 Decile 5/Decile 1 1,6 1,7 1,8 1,8 .. 2,0 2,0 .. 
 Decile 9/Decile 1 2,9 3,4 3,5 3,5 .. 4,1 4,2 .. 
 Decile 9/Decile 5 1,8 2,0 2,0 2,0 .. 2,1 2,2 .. 
United States Low Pay Incidence* 23,2 25,1 25,1 24,5 24,7 23,5 23,9 24,2 
 Decile 5/Decile 1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,0 2,1 2,1 2,1 2,1 
 Decile 9/Decile 1 4,4 4,5 4,6 4,5 4,5 4,7 4,8 4,8 
 Decile 9/Decile 5 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,2 2,3 2,3 2,3 
 
Source: OECD. *Less than two-thirds of median earnings of all workers. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Polish governments and their party composition plus composition of opposition parties 
Government  
(Prime Minister) 
Duration  Tenure of 
the Sejm 
Coalition Opposition Comment 
 Tadeusz Mazowiecki 24.08.1989- 
25.11.1990  
X Solidarność – ZSL – PZPR – SD  In 1990 ZSL transformed into PSL. 
 Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki 
12.01.1991- 
05.12.1991 
X KLD – ZChN – PC – SD   
Jan Olszewski 23.12.1991- 
05.06.1992 
I PC – ZChN – PSL-PL UD ,KLD, PPG  
 Waldemar Pawlak I 05.06.1992- 
07.07.1992 
I PSL   
Hanna Suchocka 11.07.1992- 
18.10.1993 
I UD – KLD – ZChN – PChD – PPPP – PSL-PL 
SdRP SdRP was a predecessor of SLD. 
 Waldemar Pawlak II 26.10.1993- 
01.03.1995 
II SLD – PSL – BBWR UD, UP In 1994 KLD and UD joint together and 
established UW. 
 Józef Oleksy 06.03.1995- 
26.01.1996 
II SLD – PSL UP, UW  
Włodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz 
07.02.1996- 
17.10.1997 
II SLD – PSL UP, UW  
Jerzy Buzek 31.10.1997- 
19.10.2001 
III AWS – UW PSL, SLD At the end of tenure UW left the coalition. 
Leszek Miller 19.10.2001- 
02.05.2004 
IV SLD – UP – PSL PO, PiS, LPR, Samoobrona PO and PiS have their origins in former 
coalition AWS-UW.  
Marek Belka I 02.05.2004- 
19.05.2004 
IV SLD – UP PSL, PO, PiS, LPR, SDPL, Samoobrona 
 
Marek Belka II 11.06.2004- 
19.10.2005 
IV SLD – UP PSL, PO, PiS, LPR, SDPL, Samoobrona 
 
Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz 
31.10.2005- 
10.07.2006 
V PiS – Samoobrona – LPR PO, PSL, SLD  
Jarosław Kaczyński 14.07.2006- 
05.11.2007 
V PiS – Samoobrona – LPR PO, SLD, PSL  
 Donald Tusk I 16.11.2007- 
18.11.2011 
VI PO – PSL PiS, SLD  
Donald Tusk II 18.11.2011-  VII PO – PSL PiS, SLD, RP, SP  
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Explanations for party labels 
 
AWS – Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Solidarity Electoral Action) 
BBWR – Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform (Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms) 
KLD – Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny (Liberal Democratic Congress) 
LPR – Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) 
PC – Porozumienie Centrum (Centre Agreement) 
PChD – Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów (Party of Christian Democrats) 
PiS – Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) 
PL  - Porozumienie Ludowe (People’s Agreement) 
PO – Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) 
PPPP – Polska Partia Przyjaciół Piwa (Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party) 
PSL – Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party) 
PZPR – Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, (Polish United Workers’ Party) 
RP – Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement) 
Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej – Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland 
SD – Stronnictwo Demokratyczne (Alliance of Democrats) 
SDPL – Socjaldemokracja Polska (Social Democracy of Poland) 
SLD – Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) 
SP – Solidarna Polska (United Poland) 
UD – Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union) 
UP – Unia Pracy (Labour Union) 
UW – Unia Wolności (Freedom Union) 
ZChN – Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe (Christian National Union) 
ZSL – Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, (United People’s Party) 
 
